Paper Ballots Counted In Full Public View Is the Solution - and We Need to Create it From Scratch - Here's How We Do It

There is no way in hell you should have an open vote.

Let's be clear here. We really don't care how the voting takes place. What we care about is the reporting and counting. Obviously, paper ballots can be rigged even easier than electronic ones by getting lost or duplicated or one person voting in two precincts or dead people voting or whatever. When you put 10's of thousands in charge of aggregating millions of anything, you're going to get errors and where the stakes are high, those errors are magically going to trend toward the money.

As I have posted on here a number of times, the solution lies in mandating how votes are reported to the federal level. What follows is a simple solution which actually could be implemented real world within weeks with virtually no federal cost at all. Obviously however, we just don't do anything that fast.

I would like to suggest that perhaps we're approaching the voting problem from the wrong direction. As many have said, internet voting will always be a target and as such, will always be subject to the latest threats. So I would like to offer my proposal to someone who may read it in light of helping out. This wasn't designed as a final technical specification but rather a generalized overview.

Instead of mandating how the voting takes place, which is a Constitutionally unavailable option, we simply mandate how the votes are reported to the national level.

First step: Constitutional Amendment
We rally all groups that have been silenced over the years behind a single, small amendment that validates our existing voting process. Since we supposedly can't influence state elections at the federal level, I am assuming we can only verify their legitimacy.

This Amendment would force the FEC to receive encoded votes directly from the end precinct in every election that has national implications. How they accomplish this is up to them, but they must follow a specific format. The precincts must also send a final registered voter roster with an encrypted (hashed together) number for each ballot at least 1 month in advance.

That format is in the form of a "key" code made of information of the following type. It includes the state, county, precinct, date and a check-sum. Batch 'sends' can accept these in long lists but the method of transfer is SMTP or Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (Email).

The FEC will host a email group list to which anyone can sign up for, which will be used as the addressee so that these same results will be sent to all recipients directly. This eliminates any potential doctoring of them in between. Recipients should be prepared to receive upwards of 1,000,000 emails over the course of the election. Widely available public and private data parsing programs can easily read the "key-vote" numbers and generate exact vote counts instantly.

The encryption algorithm used should take all information listed above, the vote time to the minute and the voter's full legal name and hash it in a publicly published, one-way, text manipulating formula called a hash algorithm. This ensures that given the exact same inputs, the same 'key' can be created but given the 'key', there is no way to reverse it and generate the personal information. Picture this like multiplying a dozen numbers - they always result the same but given the answer, you can never figure out the originals. A "key" is later turned into a "key-vote" by the inclusion of the actual vote and the time "minute" into this data list. A new checksum will be generated for security. No questionable letters or numbers will be allowed such as "I 1 O 0..." in the "key" or "key-vote" so that visual comparisons are made easier.

Voters are encouraged to retain private records of the local hour and minute that they voted (by a reputable time source) and keep this info private. This serves as a form of security password. While not considered 'secure', it means that 1440 "key-votes" must be checked to match just one voter to their vote once all other personal information has been collected.

Voting centers must include the key on each ballot, pre-printed or handwritten and verified by the voter and precinct staff as clearly legible and matching their voter registration card. They can be stored in alpha-numeric order for easy location and retrieval when the voter arrives to vote.

The generation software will be made public so that any web site, as well as downloadable apps, can offer this service, depending on user preference. These online services will be available to regenerate the "key" for verification or registration services, both prior to, during and after the election. This will require all the same input information, except that the vote and 'minute stamp' will be tacked to the end, again hashed with the other information. An additional section will include just the vote and the precinct location, both of which can be openly decrypted for tallying.

Vote counting and reporting at the precinct can continue under existing methods with one exception performed in any combination of the following manners:

A) A computer with online access must be made available by staff to generate the "key-vote" from the registration "key".

B) Voters must be informed of an online site where such conversion can be accomplished via any computing device online prior to going to vote.

C) Municipalities can opt to eliminate the paper voting process completely provided they set up the rules such that users can fairly and easily generate their "key-vote" and that they email both the municipality and the FEC simultaneously. Public, private and local/neighborhood/community services can aid voters with capability issues.

D) An electronic paper vote counting machine used by the precinct must be fitted with the ability to read or print the "key-vote" and allow for the tracking of it from voter to publishing.

The completed key-vote must be emailed to the local authorities, the state election board and the national FEC simultaneously. These authorities will then publish their list of received key-votes so the public can compare the lists at all levels (and to those who opted to receive the mass of direct emails).

Comparing the collected and published key-votes, provides transparency at other levels. It is now easy for the user to verify their vote was accurately counted by recalculating their key-vote and searching the national FEC list or even any of the private vote reporting sites that will pop up. Due to the manner of hashing, once the key-vote, minute code and original key are all hashed together, the resulting vote can be extrapolated by a second publicly available algorithm. This removes the counting privacy from the last stage where the vote could be changed.

While not a 100% perfect solution, this system does not require any state mandated changes to the process of voting. It provides greater security by an order of magnitude than any other solution and still allows full flexibility to the end precinct of how voting should be carried out. It also provides a platform for which to base fully online voting on, should a precinct decide to go that route. Most of all, any errors or corruption that still can take place would be easily exposed on a national level by hundreds of public sites or reporting agencies that might care to do so, and can be immediately and publicly traced directly to the precinct where it took place.

Optional Consideration: The Alternative Vote
Votes should include up to 3 choices for all federal elections, ranked in order of preference. Should the will of the people desire it, this will allow votes for candidates to only count if that candidate would win. Otherwise, the second choice is used and the 'lesser of two evils' voting attitude can be eliminated. "Key-votes" can easily incorporate this feature and simple live filters can parse this into correct votes on any computer, by the FEC, the precinct, news agencies or other for a fully transparent process.

Questions or comments, thoughts or rants?

In the age of the internet, considering the banksters can fine tune the ATM machines and rarely lose a dime it might be theoretically possible. The only problem is educating the general public as to how secure and transparent the open source concept really is.

Until then the only thing the general public can use where all involved can be assured of true transparency is a physical box they place their paper ballot in - and can monitor the entire time - while being present when it's opened and the ballots are counted so there are potentially hundreds of eyes on the whoever is doing the counting.

If we the people aren't doing the counting - then we the people are wasting our time doing the voting as well as consenting to be "represented" by people who do not have the interests of the majority in mind.

I must add that anyone who does not wish to participate should not be compelled to live under the rules which are created by any system of democracy which they did not take part in. This is only for the masses that still feel a need to have man-made laws and aren't educated enough to inherently know right from wrong.