2 votes

Van Eck phreaking - tempest - use on LCD laptop displays

Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Risks of
Flat-Panel Displays
Markus G. Kuhn
University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory,
15 JJ Thomson Avenue, Cambridge CB3 0FD, United Kingdom
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/

Abstract. Electromagnetic eavesdropping of computer displays – first
demonstrated to the general public by van Eck in 1985 – is not restricted to cathode-ray tubes. Modern flat-panel displays can be at least as vulnerable. They are equally driven by repetitive video signals in frequency ranges where even shielded cables leak detectable radio waves into the environment. Nearby eavesdroppers can pick up such compromising emanations with directional antennas and wideband receivers. Periodic averaging can lift a clearly readable image out of the background noise. The serial Gbit/s transmission formats used by modern digital video interfaces in effect modulate the signal, thereby making it even better suited for remote reception than emanations from analog systems. Understanding the exact transmission format used leads to new attacks and defenses. We can likewise modify text-display routines to render the radio emanations unreadable.

http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/pet2004-fpd.pdf

also:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Van_Eck_phreaking#cite_note-Kuh...

http://www.erikyyy.de/tempest/ (sounds neat for experimentation - may do this for Christmas).



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Bump. Deserves a look if you

Bump. Deserves a look if you were thinking laptops are necessarily safe from monitoring this way.

And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor.

And

I have the little camera at the top covered with tape because I don't want anyone spying on my...