1 vote

Does it violate NAP?

Arrest - seizing a person suspected or accused of a crime against his will and holding him captive.

Jury trial - How can the democratic vote or consensus of random people justify the inflicting of loss of liberty on a person?

Would NAP conforming security agencies be permitted to arrest and hold suspects for trial?

Arrest and trial are not self defense. In essence, a person is kidnapped and imprisoned on suspicion, pending a decision by some other people.

The principle of convincing some arbitrary number of people, beyond their subjective reasonable doubt, of the victim's guilt, is essentially a democratic principle. The principle assumes it is valid for one group of people to deny liberty or life to another person, and decide their fate, on the basis of a group consensus.

The punishment inflicted on the accused by the tribunal, to which he never consented to be subjected, is aggression. It is violence and coercion which is not in self defense. It works on the principle that twelve against one (the jury against the accused) is a sufficient ratio to override the rights of the accused.

Why twelve, instead of two, instead of two hundred?

Nothing in the arrest or trial of a suspect can be construed as self defense. It is, rather, the claim to jurisdiction over another person merely on suspicion and accusation, and the claim of a right to inflict harm or loss of liberty on that person, on the basis of what twelve random strangers think.

This applies equally to any security agency that a person has not voluntarily contracted to consent to. It too would be committing aggression in the process of arrest, trial and punishment.

It would seem to me that arrest on suspicion or accusation, as well as trial by any court to which the individual did not willingly subject himself by contract, would constitute aggression. This is so whether carried out by a security agency or by a publicly funded court, and so would violate NAP.

Furthermore, a person can always deny that they contracted to any such subjection (or to any contract, in fact). A contract based on signature is just a scrap of paper. If the alleged signer disputes it, that too must go before judgment, before a panel or tribunal of some sort, for a verdict.

The person is then essentially accused of breaking a contract, and so that accusation in turn is itself subject to a decision, necessarily by third parties.

This tribunal, or arbitration, suffers from all the problems described above for general trial where no contractual consent is claimed to have been granted.

On what grounds can one person, or group of people, override the claim of another person that they never agreed to a contract?

On what grounds can they then forcibly hold them to terms which they claim they never consented to?

It seems that any arrest or trial of another person inherently violates NAP, as all depend on validating aggression on the basis of some arbitrary consensus of other people, whether twelve or some other number.

Can a democratic principle of consensus ever nullify a person's right to be free of aggression?

If not, then all arrests and trials are invalid on NAP.

If it can, then that means the principle of consensus or democratic judgment is valid, as such.

If its valid for a group to decide the fate of an individual, this establishes the whole principle behind coercive government.

Pick your poison.

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Michael Nystrom's picture

Ad hominem attack



He's the man.


It was a typo and when I went to change it I got a 403. :p

If you peruse my comment history you will see such things are out of my character.

~wobbles but doesn't fall down~

Michael Nystrom's picture

Ok, I'll withdraw the flag

Picking it up and putting in back in my back pocket.

Resume play!

He's the man.

Can you edit it for me?


~wobbles but doesn't fall down~


Big finger or weird keyboard?

Gimme a kiss.

Too much multi-tasking...

cooking, talking on phone while typing. :D

~wobbles but doesn't fall down~

Michael Nystrom's picture

That's a lot of stuff

Ok - I edited your title, as per your request.

He's the man.
Michael Nystrom's picture

Bill3, I really love you

And I hope you're having fun. I certainly am.

It is a pleasure to behold, watching you in action.

Few have the necessary guts, balls and intelligence to do what you do, and for that I salute you.

He's the man.
Michael Nystrom's picture

Love is downvoted


He's the man.

Haters hate

even love. - Jesus

I love you, too!

And it is fun, although I'm not sure it should be. : )

I guess everything in moderation.

Fascinating Post

I think you have revealed a rather thorny epistemological issue.

In the formal sense, a "philosophy" (including, perhaps especially, a "political philosophy") assumes that certain things are "knowable" with absolute certainty. This obviously includes the axioms and postulates of the philosophy.

In this respect, a formal "philosophy" is an abstract construct. In the best case, it is rather like mathematics or logic. Its conclusions flow naturally and inexorably from its postulates. They can be known with certainty to be correct, so long as the postulates are correct.

This stands in stark contrast to the material world. In the material world (even in the "hard sciences," such as physics) our current understanding of reality tells us that we can know nothing with absolute certainty. At best, we can make probabilistic statements about objective reality (even though, in many cases, the probabilities are very high).

So, by way of analogy, the world of "political science" (for lack of a better term) grapples with the "real world" - the "material world" of complex organisms interacting politically. And, in that world, there is no complete certainty.

So, in brief, your cognitive dissonance is a result of your superposition of the worlds of "political philosophy" (the domain of the mind) and "political science" (the domain of the material world).


You've misunderstood the post.

I'm not experiencing cognitive dissonance. I'm pointing out why principles like NAP are silly in reality. If you re read with that understanding, you'd probably agree with my points, I think.

Fascinating Post

"Political Science" attempts to erect "social structures" which implement a political philosophy in the real world.

It must be accepted as axiomatic ;) that this implementation will be imperfect.

The best you can hope for is that it will produce the "desired" outcome with a high statistical probability.

In the "most libertarian" implementation that we can imagine (other than the trivial case in which each individual is completely isolated from all other individuals), we might imagine many small groups of individuals who have explicitly consented to be bound by the decisions of certain "political processes."

Now, you raise the objection that perhaps the person did not consent, and rightly point out that it is impossible to know with 100% certainty that they did consent.

I would put this in the category of overly abstract navel gazing.

It is a fact of objective reality that you can have a very high probability of certainty concerning whether or not someone consented to a given contract, and that you can erect political structures which result in this outcome with a very high degree of confidence. That is the best that you are going to do.

.... contd

You're mistaken

It is not a discussion about the level of certainty. It is a discussion about the validity of a group consensus for violating an individuals liberty. On NAP, the principle to which so many adhere, this would never be valid. If there is any abstract navel gazing, it is with those who base their political views on this principle. You, being reasonable, might not take it seriously. But those who do should be corrected. Making an argument about your personal opinion about whether 12 low IQ'd, disinterested jurors can be "100%" certain has precisely nothing to do with the points in question.

Fascinating Post

Now, moving on to the world of "Realpolitik," it appears to be a fact of reality that humans will interact, and that they will interact violently and aggressively from time to time.

In a grossly oversimplified way, we might say that, beyond a certain point, and "philosophy aside," the mob will rule. In other words, a significant majority will have their way, and there is not much you can do about it.

The very creation and promulgation of a "political philosophy" is an attempt to convince others to behave in a certain way, and to consent to certain political structures.

As a free and autonomous individual, you can choose to combine with others politically (if for no other reason, than for mustering a common defense against those groups with which you have less agreement) or you can choose to act strictly as an isolated free agent.

You face that choice just as surely in a "libertarian" society as you do in contemporary America, or in South Korea.

But the choice is yours, and yours alone, now, and always.

I appreciate your comments

you're obviously very well read and adept at the topic. I do think your objections against me are unfounded, I just don't want to come off purely as a jerk.

If I can anticipate your response to my above responses, I think you will probably argue that arrest and trial are legitimate on NAP, or that most NAP adherents accept that there has to be arrest, trial, etc.

I would counter that 1) not all NAP adherents are so loose in their interpretation; many on these boards (the more sophisticated, in fact, like Seamusin and Micah) accept a strict construction of the NAP to mean no arrests on suspicion and no involuntary trial. And for those who accept arrest and trial, etc.,

2) They need to simple reformulate NAP to make it accurate and internally consistent.

If you say that arrest is allowed on NAP, as it is standardly formulated, it is simply a self defeating statement, because internally inconsistent.

Arrest is aggression as defined by NAP - force used not in self defense. Aggression is illegitimate. These are mutually exclusive under the standard NAP formulation.

The proper reformulation would go "aggression is invalid except in self defense, and in cases where there is a sufficient consensus of certainty that a person violated NAP in the past to allow for his arrest, trial, and judgment."

In that simple formulation, NAP would be consistent internally. It would still remain to be defined what is a "legitimate sufficient consensus" to permit arrest. By definition, an arrest on suspicion or accusation is not a consensus of guilty, merely a consensus of some sort that there is sufficient probable cause. It is not even assumed the accused suspect is necessarily guilty; on the contrary, his innocence is assumed.

For sentencing and verdict, there need be defined a valid level of consensus for punishing the accused.

Any such valid levels of consensus will serve in reality to establish that a majority vote / mob rule, as you described it, is in fact valid.

This utterly explodes the deontological, standard NAP as regularly formulated, and is an entirely different beast.

I would fully be open to correctly formulated and consequentialist versions of NAP that accept the validity of the group consensus and don't claim any universally valid, a priori claim that "force outside of self defense is never legitimate."

This would declaw the NAP argument against government, though, by acknowledging that sufficient consensus overrides individual rights vis a vi force. This is all I attempted to prove, and have done so to my satisfaction.

Juries (Post 4)

PS: I think you are misunderstanding juries. Juries are not a "democratic body" organized to form a majority consensus. They are, in fact, exactly opposite. They are highly undemocratic.

In a "democratic process" the majority makes law. Laws are an authorization to use force within society.

On a jury, a verdict must typically be unanimous in order for the force of law to be applied to the defendant. In other words, a tiny minority (only 1 person) can prevent force from being used. Further, in a libertarian society (and technically still even in the United States) a jury can rule not only on the guilt of the defendant, but on the justice of the law itself (jury nullification)!

The whole point of this exercise is to reduce the chance that a mistake will be made, and that force will be used wrongfully. Implicit in this process is the idea that "it is better for a guilty man to go free than for an innocent man to be punished."

It is self evidently true that it is more difficult to convince 2 people that someone is guilty than to convince only 1 person. And it is more difficult to convince 3 than 2, and so on.

Philosophy cannot tell us the "correct" number of jurors. That is determined empirically. However, philosophy can tell us that having juries reduces rather than increases the possibility of violating the NAP egregiously, and using force wrongfully.

Neither philosophy nor empirical facts

can decide that 'correct' number of jurors, for that is a value judgement about how often you're willing to get the wrong result on a particular side (letting guilty walk or innocent rot). On any particular preference, there may be an ideal retrospective jury number.

Either way, this says nothing on the point of whether a group consensus can determine that an individual's rights can be violated. NAP precludes any aggression, any force not in self defense. So any arrest and trial process is necessarily aggression, since it attacks the accused against his will, and does so moreover prior to any verdict.

Even if he was tried in absentia, the consensus of 3 or 100 people to commit aggression doesn't validate aggression. If aggression is valid on consensus by a large number, that would need to be stated within a reformulated NAP, otherwise NAP is invalid.

On any formulation, arrest and trial and consensus verdict is not self defense, and so not part of NAP.

It is true that jury and a pure democratic lynch are different concepts, and it is false to say I don't understand this. I clearly understand that they are different, but both are small 'd' democratic in the sense that they both rely on the validity of some group consensus over the individual.

This principle of group consensus being valid to determine an individuals fate is not part of NAP, which is the only point I wished to carry, and in fact did carry.

Juries are arbitrarily set small to avoid lone dissenters, so that consensus is possible. But a consensus of an arbitrarily restricted number is still really just a majority vote, since as a reflection of the society as a whole there is no unanimity.

It is arbitrary to impose the will of 12 people on one accused, and violates NAP in every way NAP can be violated.

You said

"So any arrest and trial process is necessarily aggression, since it attacks the accused against his will, and does so moreover prior to any verdict."

This is incorrect. A person who violates NAP is "guilty" of violating NAP at the instant that he does it. His guilt is not determined by the finding of a jury, or even if he was caught at all. If he got away with it completely unobserved, he would still be guilty, although only he would know it.

The purpose of a trial is to determine if there is sufficient evidence of guilt as perceived by a group of outside observers (jurors) to use collective sanctioned violence (punishment) against him.

If the jury finds the defendant to be guilty, and the defendant was truly guilty, then no violation of NAP has occurred (for reasons I have cited elsewhere, but can rehash if you are unclear).

However, if the jury issues a guilty verdict, and the accused was in fact innocent, then a violation of NAP has occurred. If, at some later date, this mistake is discovered, then the unjustly punished party should be compensated for his unjust punishment.

On the other hand, if a jury makes a mistake in the other direction, and acquits a defendant who is guilty, no violation of NAP has occurred, although a miscarriage of "justice" has occurred if you believe that the guilty deserve punishment.

Once again, you want there to be certainty where there is none. The baseline for determining whether NAP has been violated is the opinion of a single person (the victim) and the internal knowledge of the perpetrator (which is unknowable to anyone else).

A jury of more than one person is mathematically certain to be more difficult to convince of guilt than a single person. Therefore, a jury is a social construct which is "biased" towards in the direction of NAP, and which will acquit more often than an individual acting alone (especially if that individual is the victim). As the number of jurors increase, the probability of an incorrect "guilty" verdict decreases.

This may result in fewer convictions, but it also results in less violations of NAP (but will result in less "justice" in the abstract sense, if we had omniscience).


That said, I agree that neither philosophy nor empirical facts (alone) can determine the correct number of jurors. That can only be determined (by an individual) according to a scheme of global risk management. An individual would need to know the probability that he would be improperly convicted of a crime in a given society, and weigh this risk against other risks (such as having a car wreck, etc.). If the probability is low, compared to the other hazards of life, then the individual might consent to the system of social constructs that have been erected to administer "justice." But if the probability is comparatively high that he would suffer such a fate, he would do well to seek out a different society.

Your objections do not actually refute the

quoted statement.

The person making the arrest against the accused is guilty of aggression at that very moment, regardless of any facts that get dug up later. At the time of the arrest, he is attacking a presumed innocent. The fact that this act is aggression is a fact concurrent with the moment it takes place; no facts dredged up later about the accused can make the arrest non aggressive.

There is no post facto imputing to the aggressive act of arrest the quality of non aggression, if some group of people are convinced he is guilty at a later point; at the time of the arrest, this convincing of an arbitrary number of people had not occurred, and so the person who attacked the accused was attacking a person who had never harmed him, and who he had no knowledge that he had ever been aggressive to anyone.

The world could end the next instant; nothing that happens later to legally validate the action can change the justness or aggressiveness of his act. At the time he committed the kidnapping, the accused person was just a person minding his own business, and the perpetrator of the kidnapping was acting aggressively, in violation of NAP. Such an act is inherently invalid on NAP, and so could not occur in accordance with NAP.

The violent resistance of the accused against his attacked would be fully justified by NAP. Nothing that the accused had done in his past life can ever have any impact on whether the action of the kidnapper was just; it was unjust because it violated NAP, and because it was aggressive and not in self defense.

It is no different than if Bob captures or kill a person, and then after the fact, dredges up a crime they probably committed 45 years ago, to exonerate himself. The act was still aggressive because Bob was neither acting in self defense, nor with the certainty of the guilt of the victim.

Your arguments actually make my case. The arrest is aggression even if it is later determined by some arbitrary number of people that the accused had probably done something aggressive.

NAP Cont'd (Post 3 of 3)

In any event, I have been exploring this question at the level of the individual actor before broaching the subject of "collective action" for a reason. I think you need to be clear on what you believe about the use of force at the individual level before moving on, because an individual cannot delegate any power that he does not possess in a state of nature.

And really, I think that most, if not all, of your objections can be answered by examining interaction at the individual level. Individuals act, and even if they attempt to act in a way that is consistent with their philosophy, they will sometimes make mistakes.


Moving on to "collective action," is not so difficult as you make it out to be. Fundamentally, it is not really a question of "voting" etc. The fundamental issue is whether or not another person is justified in coming to the defense of someone else who is being attacked, or has been attacked. Implicitly, the libertarian philosophy says that you can come to someone else's defense. A prosaic example would be a small woman being attacked by one or more large men. In this case, it is pretty easy to see that you would be justified in coming to her defense.


Once you concede these three points:

(1) Retroactive force is justified against someone who has violated the NAP,

(2) It is justified for one person to assist another person who is being or has been attacked,

(3) Mistakes can and will be made in the use of defensive force, and when mistakes are made, the victim of the force should be compensated.

then I think most of your objections melt away.


In general, the argument for delegating the administration of justice (the use of retroactive force) to the "collective" is to insure that force is used in a more measured and deliberative manner.

If you run around attempting to dish out justice yourself, there is going to be a smaller disparity of sheer power between you and the person who is the object of your quest. Therefore, it is likely that, either through lack of control over your own emotions, or because you cannot calibrate your use of force in the way that a stronger force can, you would end up using more force than necessary more frequently.

In contrast, if you are being assisted in your quest for justice by other members of your community (such as the police) who are able to muster relatively overwhelming force, and who are trained in how to apply it in a measured and deliberative way, it is likely that the overall level of violence will be lower.

At least, that is the rationale.

Okay then, let's have at it!

Let's start with my first premise.

1. In a force-conflict involving two persons, only one can be the initiator of force against the other's body. Property is separate and has to be dealt with separate. [How define force? Intentionality? Harm? Nonconsent? In fact, who even decides the definition? If its just up to the two individuals, they can decide on any rule or definition, and enforce it with their own strength]

2. Such a conflict will always go to the stronger unless outside parties get involved.

3. The outside parties have to define the rules in which they will be willing to take one side or the other.

4. If that rule is NAP, then the rule is "Force must only be used in self defense against initiation of force against person or property. Force used in self defense of person or property is just, and we will assist in this, and force initiated is unjust, and we will assist in attacking or repulsing this."

5. The definition of property is likewise decided by the enforcing body, otherwise if left to either of the conflicting parties, Might is the only deciding factor.

6. As formulated, NAP states that only self defense is valid, so self defense has to be defined.

7. Self defense is obvious up to a point, where it becomes a grey area, and after that it is obviously not self defense. We will quickly identify the obvious cases, then focus on the grey area and the things obviously not self defense.

8. Repulsing direct attack is obviously self defense. Assuming for the sake of argument a consensus definition of legitimate property, then repulsing direct attack on property is defensive.

9. The grey area begins with pursuit of the initiator of the aggression if he chooses to retreat or flee. Is pursuit self defense? Arguably it is, since the attacked party is trying to neutralize the presumed future threat.

10. No longer self defense - clearly imo. The individual spots the attacker who fled and knows that he is the attacker (barring the twin possibility or clone or shapeshifting reptile). Is capturing the aggressive party to "teach him a lesson" self defense? Clearly not. It is punishment, retribution, revenge, justice, punitive, rehabilitative. Whatever you might want to label it, it is not self defense as the words are defined.

11. Is it justified, even though it is not self defense?

I think you're arguing that it is justified on NAP, by defining it as self defense to punish.

From this, you conclude that a third party can be contracted to act on behalf of the victim to capture and punish the original aggressor. No trial need be held to justify it; it is the will of the victim acting through a hired surrogate, a hired gun, mercenary, body guard, whatever you want to call it.

A trial in this circumstance would merely be the third parties way of satisfying himself, if he's at all interested, that the captured accused is guilty. But he does not know whether the captured accused party is guilty; he must presume he's innocent. Therefore, he cannot capture him without violating NAP himself.

If he looked into the case without bias to the point that he was convinced to the same degree that the original victim is convinced, 100% certainty, then he could justly attack and capture the accused in the same sense as the expanded self defense concept you've offered us for the victim.

But it isn't possible for the third party who is hired to be this certain, since he was not there. He must always be acting aggressively by attacking, capturing and punishing the accused, since he can never have the level of certainty that is equivelant to the level of the self-defending victim. He is always acting on the basis of being convinced (and paid!) beyond a reasonable doubt, which is arbitrary (reasonable according to who?)

12. This is in the eye of the beholder. It may be justified in the opinion of the victim to attack the aggressor for a lesson. But that isn't very important, because the individual can decide whatever he wants is just and enforce it if he had the Might.

What we're concerned with here is the third parties acting on the basis of a specific principle.

If that principle is NAP, including an expanded definition of self defense to include what is not normally called self defense, such as revenge, then only the victim or a direct witness can act with that revenge, being certain to the same extent as the victim.

The third party agent who is hired to investigate and mete out revenge can never have that level of conviction, and so must always be attacking someone who is either presumed innocent, or at least is not guilty beyond the possible doubt of the agent.

This brings into question the level of certainty that is required to justly act violently toward someone on NAP.

13. If someone attacks me, I am 100% certain, barring delusionality, that I am defending myself.

On the other hand, if someone I trust merely accuses another, I don't know their mind or heart or motive, so I can only come in post facto as an investigator.

This is then the principle of beyond a reaosnable doubt, and is inherently arbitrary and inherently depends on the vestment of authority to decide, either in a competent judge, or else a randomly selected number of competent persons (judge and jury).

The decision of what threshold is 'reasonable' must be made by the person or institution meting out justice.

For this person or institution to in fact, in practice, be permitted to make these decisions effectively, requires that the mob of society respect their right or jurisdiction over the case, and believe in their impartiality and competence.

Or, it requires they be sufficiently strong to quell a mob or put it down, but this would be Might is right, not Justice with consent of the judged and governed.

Anyway, I disgress.

That is why it is important that the individual or institution deciding cases has no direct stake or interest in the decision, and is impartial. This tends not to be the case both on a for profit model, or on a model of democratic beaurcracy, where the agent in charge has an interest in generating cases, convicting the tried, and keeping the funding flowing from tax dollars.

It is more likely on a non beauracratic, light weight minarchist government or on a top down light weight constitutional autocrat who has no partiality and no interest or gain in amplifying the conviction rate or selling his services to one or another side.

14. We're far afield by now from the NAP, strict constructed, which only permits self defense, without our generous definitional extension to cover revenge and punishment.

We're in the realm now of justice as being decided by a third party, either autocrat or constituional mob, that chooses based on a principle of action: namely, the fact of being convinced that the accused is guilty beyond a certain threshold of doubt.

15. This level or threshold is never going to be equal to the victim or direct witnesses, and so it is arbitrary to say whether the third party, non witness feels that it is justified for him to act as a surrogate on behalf of the victim or witness to punish the accused.

16. This then becomes a question merely of power, whether the structured / constitutional mob, or the rule-based autocrat, decides that this level of convicned-ness, beyond a certain doubt, is sufficient to punish or act aggressively toward the accused.

17. This merely serves to show us that justice as a concept is dependent on the arbitrary determination of 'what is just' according to the party, person or institution, that judges and punishes.

18. If the principle chosen by that party is to punish aggression in the place of the victim, then it is required that his level of certainty be equal to the victim. This is impossible if he's not a direct witness.

19. Therefore, any punishment by a third party that was not a direct witness is not the same as self defense, but is instead the claiming of jurisdiction to judge the affairs of other men on the basis of uncertain information.

20. Being permitted to act aggressively to arrest or punish other people on the basis of this kind of jurisdiction is not self defense, and is not representative self defense. It is justice in the sense of the right to judge the affairs of other men; it is law.

It may have rules and levels of certainty required, but they are not equal to that of direct witnesses or the victim.

If it is valid for a third party agent to arrest, judge and punish without the level of certainty of the victim or witness, this then would violate the NAP as it is normally formulated. It would also establish the validity of a group consensus of an arbitrary number of people, empowered to judge by either a mob or an autocrat (power), over the right of the individual to be free of aggressive action not carried out in self defense.

21. Therefore, they violate NAP as formulated on the standard way and on the basis of standard definitions of the words involved in the formulation.

I just noticed

this great post, which I think clarifies and sums up your arguments very well.

I will respond in more detail later.

However, I would point out that one major flaw in this line of reasoning is that you assume that a jury would have less certainty, rather than more certainty, about the guilt of the accused, than would the original victim.

This is self-evidently incorrect. The certainty of the victim is merely the baseline. Obviously, if the victim says: "no, that is not the guy that assaulted me," then the defendant will be released.

So, in the case of a jury trial, not only must the victim be sure in his own mind that the defendant is guilty, so too must each and every juror.

Therefore, a jury trial decreases rather than increases the possibility of a serious violation of the NAP.

In my opinion

the jury, not to mention the arresting and detaining parties, can never be as certain as the victim or other direct witnesses. If there are no other direct witnesses, then no one else besides the victim can act to arrest or detain the accused without themselves committing aggression against him. I think this settles the issue, unless you can demonstrate how the jury, let alone the arresting party, could be more certain than the person acting in self defense.

Let's distinguish between victim, and person acting in self defense.

A victim could potentially have no knowledge, let alone certainty, of a crime; he wasn't there when his house was robbed, or he was knocked out from behind.

But this victim also couldn't act in self defense, so has no relevance to the issue. He would also be acting aggressively if he attacked someone on suspicion rather than certainty; whether just or not to do so, it is not self defense either way.

Therefore, the comparison is between the person acting in self defense, and the juror or arresting agent.

I would contend that they could never be certain; video evidence is not as certain as direct involvement, count be faked and probably will be routinely once the technology is beyond forensic resources ability to dispute. Plus, the possibility of conspiracy and collusion against the accused always prevents there being any certainty comparable to a direct witness or self-defender.

Likewise with DNA, it could be faked, planted, etc. This is only to prove that there can be no certainty comparable to the directly involved self defender or an eye witness.

So, it cannot be called self defense to gather information and make a verdict. That is something different; a claim to the right to judge third parties for events you didn't witness, and to arrest people who are presumed innocent.

This is aggression, as defined by NAP and those words which are part of the NAP formulation, on their standard definitions.

I'm not used to your

style of responding in segments which appear out of order, so I will respond above to your three parts. My response beneath this was after just reading the 3rd part in isolation, which obviously made no sense to me.


Yes. I apologize for that. I am not used to the way in which the daily Paul forum software works, and I was attempting to avoid deeper "indent" levels. This caused my posts to appear in reverse order, so I went back and numbered them for clarity.

There is no need...

for you to apologize to BILL3 for attacking your character (ad hominem) by criticizing your style of presentation (style over substance fallacy).

Although your layout was a bit non-conventional, I figured it out without thinking much (and so did Bill3).

You politely and respectfully presented a thoughtful, well-tempoed in detailed and impersonal line of reasoning of your take on the NAP and the related concepts of defense, juries, etc.. You even took the time to apologize several times (unnecessarily) and help ease his anxiety over thinking of himself as a jerk (understandably).

Don't let him bully you by his employment of attacks on your style and character as a smokescreen and distraction from the substance of the content you presented.

~wobbles but doesn't fall down~

My comment

was an apology for replying to post 3, which is the first I viewed, because I didnt see the other two until after. Kyles style of posting, with two separate series of posts over two days, each numbered 1-3, is confusing as you scroll down and read a post labeled (3) which seems to make no sense. This is why, after reading 2 and 1 of today's posts, I quickly apologized to kyle for my first reply, and then provided a very long 21 paragraph reply to his second three part contribution to this debate.

As is par for the course, you contribute nothing of value.

Did you learn,,,

your style of lacing nearly all your comments with personal attacks from Jesus? Is Jesus proud of you calling someone in an earlier comment a "big mouth fool who should just shut up". Do you personally think Jesus is pleased?

~wobbles but doesn't fall down~