US vs Syria: How to Lose a War in 3 YearsSubmitted by go213mph on Fri, 06/27/2014 - 21:26
Excerpts taken from the middle of the article.
The narrative, repeated across the Western media, illustrates how the US finishes up a lost war. First, it makes excuses as to why deviations from the West’s original narrative have manifested themselves in demonstrable and undeniable events, like Syria’s elections and the overwhelming support Damascus visibly commands across the country. Next it revises history to account for how and why events unfolded differently than expected. In Syria, the protracted warfare that eventually revealed Syria’s “freedom fighters” to be armies of foreign-funded terrorists flowing over the nation’s borders is explained as extremists “hijacking” or “derailing” the “revolution.”
To see just how far from reality TIME Magazine and others still perpetuating this myth have departed, readers should recall Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh’s 2007 New Yorker article, “The Redirection” which prophetically stated:
To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Administration has coöperated with Saudi Arabia’s government, which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda.
Throughout the rest of Hersh’s nine-page report, which came out 4 years before the so-called “Arab Spring” unfolded, is outlined in specific detail how the West and its regional allies including Israel and Saudi Arabia, were already funneling in cash and arraying armed sectarian extremists against Hezbollah inside of Lebanon and against the government of Syria. Hersh’s report even included a retired CIA agent who portended the sectarian nature of the impending, regional conflict.
The third and final step the US must take upon losing a war is to leave chaos where victory was denied, and attach responsibility for the conflict to a disposable elected politician – in this case US President Barack Obama. While the war was clearly conceived during the administration of George Bush as early as 2007, it was executed under the watch of Obama. By attaching responsibility for the conflict to Obama, when his term is up and he passes into the hindsight of history, corporate-financier funded policy makers will have before them a clean slate upon which to begin carrying out the next leg of their continuous agenda.
Before the Syrian conflict is fully forgotten, however, the US will ensure that the process of reconciliation and reconstruction is made as problematic as possible for Damascus. Despite for all intents and purposes, losing the war, the West has continued supplying weapons and aid to militants within and along Syria’s borders. TIME Magazine appears to almost revel in the fact that despite the “rebels” losing, it will be years before Syria is able to recover to pre-war conditions. TIME states:
For all his swaggering claims of victory, Assad presides over a country in a profound state of destruction and distress. The U.N. Relief and Works Agency estimates that even if the war were to end immediately, it would take 30 years for the economy to recover to pre-2010 levels — and then only if GDP grew at a steady 5% a year. According to government statistics, prices of basic consumer goods like food and fuel have tripled. Half the workforce is jobless, and more than half the population is living in poverty.
With the US and its regional partners still pumping in weapons and fighters, it plans to ensure recovery is as slow and as painful as possible. In fact, US policy makers within the corporate-funded Brookings Institution in a 2012 Middle East Memo titled “Assessing Options for Regime Change,” stated:
The United States might still arm the opposition even knowing they will probably never have sufficient power, on their own, to dislodge the Asad network. Washington might choose to do so simply in the belief that at least providing an oppressed people with some ability to resist their oppressors is better than doing nothing at all, even if the support provided has little chance of turning defeat into victory. Alternatively, the United States might calculate that it is still worthwhile to pin down the Asad regime and bleed it, keeping a regional adversary weak, while avoiding the costs of direct intervention.