GOOGLE* Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim and Right

What happens if you do not have a SSN? First you can still get US passports in two weeks or less, no problem. You can still register for the selective service, no problem. Both my son and daughter have US Passports and my son registered for the selective service, with no SSN's.

The Real ID Act does not require a person have a SSN to obtain a drivers license, this is called a non compliant license. My son has a drivers license.

Non-Conforming DL/IDs §202(c)(11)
In any case in which a state issues a DL/ID that does not satisfy the federal requirements, a state shall ensure that that the DL/ID: (A) clearly states on its face that it may not be accepted for federal identification or any other official purpose, and (B) uses a unique design or color indicator to alert federal agencies or other law enforcement personnel that it may not be accepted for any such purpose

SSA publication 5-100023 states applying for a SSN is voluntary as does the Social Security act and its subsequent amendments.

As for the IRS, 26 USC 6109 Identifying numbers states in section (c) - For purposes of this section, the Secretary is authorized to require such information as may be necessary to assign an identifying number to any person.

Section (c) identifies two purposes. The first purpose is to authorize the Secretary to require such information as may be necessary, no more and no less than needed. The second purpose identified is for the Secretary to assign an identifying number to any person. The first “to” is a linking verb that links “authorized” to “require.” The second “to” is a preposition and means “for the purpose of.” Clearly the plain and literal language requires the Secretary to assign an identifying number to any person. “Any” includes all, excludes none. No exceptions, exclusion or conditions are identified within this section.

Section (d) is what the IRS uses to require all who are eligible for a SSN to apply for one. However, the interpretation of the IRS is WRONG!

26 § 6109 Section (d) Use of a Social Security Account Number –

“The social security account number issued to an individual for purposes of section 205(c)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act shall, except as shall otherwise be specified under regulations of the Secretary, be used as the identifying number for such individual for purposes of this title.”

“for purposes of this title” means that the use of the SSN is restricted to title 26 and no other title is authorized by this section to use the SSN. “for Such individual” “such” refers to something previously identified or known. The only thing known about this individual is that the individual was issued a social security account number per the section 205(c)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act. “for purpose of section 205(c)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act” does not require an individual ever apply for a SSN. SSA publication 5-10023 states applying for a SSN is voluntary. Clearly “The social security account number issued to an individual for purposes of section 205(c)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act shall be used as the identifying number for such individual for purposes of this title” does not require any individual have or apply for a SSN.

26 § 6109 Section (d) is also interpretive in terms of “except as shall otherwise be specified under regulations of the Secretary.” The interpretive clause “except as shall otherwise be specified under regulations of the Secretary” has two key common words with popular meanings, except and otherwise. Except means to exclude from a list, statement or category. Otherwise means something else, anything else or contrary too. The plain and literal meaning is clear; the secretary is authorized to exclude the social security account number from the list of identifying numbers and in its place specify something else, anything else, or something contrary to the social security account number. It does not authorize the secretary to include individuals who were not identified in the legislative portion of this section and extend by implication the default requirement, of those who have a social security account number, to those who do not.

Here is the information you need to fight the IRS if you do not wish to be numbered with a SSN.

1. First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or the free exercise there of.

2. In construing a statute, courts generally seek the plain and literal meaning of its language. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93, 95-96 (1985); United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). For that purpose, courts generally assume that Congress uses common words in their popular meaning. See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 28 (1987), affg. 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985).

3. In deciding whether the regulation comports with the statute’s plain language, we look to the ordinary usage or settled meanings of the words used in the statute by Congress. See Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925). There is a strong presumption that Congress expresses its intention through the language it chooses. See INS v. Cardoza- Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987).

4. A regulation may not contradict the unambiguous language of a statute. See Citizen’s Natl. Bank v. United States, 417 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1969); Hefti v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 180, 189 (1991), affd. 983 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1993).

5. Where the statute’s language is plain, the language is where the interpretive task should end, and the sole function of the courts is to enforce such language according to its terms. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 187-188 (1923)(stating that tax statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used).

6. Petitioners claim a violation of RFRA. Petitioners request appropriate relief against respondent. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb-1(c). A claimant under the RFRA must show that the Government “substantially burdened” his or her free exercise of religion. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb-1(a). Upon such a showing, the Government must demonstrate that the application of the burden to the person (i) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (ii) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb-1(b). The Government’s burden is both of production and persuasion. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb-2(3).

7. Recently the Supreme Court ruled in favor of The Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, supra 04-1084, the government was attempting to prohibit the use of a drug in a religious ceremony. The petitioners claimed a violation of RFRA. Chief Justice John Roberts, held that the federal government had not adequately demonstrated that it had a compelling interest in banning what even federal prosecutors admit is a "sincere religious practice." The Supreme Court found that the federal government had not adequately demonstrated that it had a compelling interest in banning a drug used in a religious ceremony. In petitioners’ case, the respondent has not only infringed on their religious beliefs, but also taken away their right to work, open a bank account, buy and sell property, attend collage and to travel. The burden placed on the petitioners’ family is substantial and excessive. No federal law shall "substantially burden a person's exercise of religion" unless the government proves the law furthers a "compelling governmental interest" and that it has been implemented in a way that is "least restrictive" to religious practices.

8. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); the United States Supreme Court specifically held that Jehovah Witness students could not be compelled to salute the flag against their religious beliefs.

9. In Quaring v. Peterson , 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff..d sub nom, Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985), 105 S.Ct. 3492 (1985), a Nebraska driver’s license applicant brought an action against Nebraska officials seeking to compel them to issue a driver’s license, notwithstanding the applicant’s refusal to be photographed. Quaring was a member of the Christian religion. Quaring’s belief is that the Second Commandment expressly forbids the making of .any graven image or likeness. of anything in creation. Exodus 20:4; Deuteronomy 5:8. Quaring’s refusal to allow herself to be photographed was a response to a literal interpretation of the Second Commandment. The court noted that Quaring’s beliefs were religious in nature, though unusual in the twentieth century. The Eighth Circuit found that Quaring’s beliefs were sincerely held religious beliefs, which were in fact burdened by the Nebraska state law. Weighing the Nebraska state law against the First Amendment claims of Quaring, the court determined that the state interests were not so compelling that Quaring’s beliefs could not be accommodated. The court required Nebraska to issue Quaring a driver’s license. The court in Quaring noted that the Second Commandment remains a fundamental tenet of both the Jewish and Christian faith and that interpretation and commentary on the Second Commandment lends support to Quaring’s personal interpretation. The Court noted that although the position and current practice is in the minority, that Quaring was still entitled to protection. In fact, the Quaring court (citing Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) stated as follows:
[T]he guaranty of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function and competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow [adherent] more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.

10. Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Employment Division D.P.H.R. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the law in this country was that free exercise rights protected by the First Amendment could not be infringed upon by a governmental entity unless that governmental entity met the compelling state interest test. The compelling state interest test required not only the state to prove that it had a compelling state interest to infringe upon the individual’s religious beliefs, but requires the state to show that it was acting in the least restrictive means. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U’s. 398 (1963), a Seventh Day Adventist who believed that work on Saturdays, her Sabbath, was unbiblical, was refused unemployment benefits. She challenged the denial under the free exercise rights protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court analyzed the case under the compelling state interest test and concluded as follows:
For [i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. [cite omitted] Here not only is it apparent that appellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.

11. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572 (1928) (authored by Louis D. Brandeis): They [the makers of the Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone, the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.

12. Freedom of speech was tested when a group of students wore black arm bands to school to protest the Vietnam War. The students were expelled and the students took the school system to court. The District Court concluded that the action of the school authorities was reasonable because it was based upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the armbands. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,393 U.S. 503 (1969); the United States Supreme Court wrote in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom -- this kind of openness -- that is [p509] the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.

13. In Larsen Vs Commissioner Internal Revenue Service, T.C. Memo.2008-l70, the Internal Revenue Service conceded dependent exemptions and child tax credits to their five children without Social Security Numbers.

14. Title 26 - USC - Internal Revenue Code § 6109 Identifying Numbers identifies two types of numbers. § 6109 (c) Requirement of information.
“For purposes of this section, the Secretary is authorized to require such information as may be necessary to assign an identifying number to any person.”

15. § 6109 (d) Use of a social security account number.
“The social security account number issued to an individual for purposes of section 205(c)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act shall, except as shall otherwise be specified under regulations of the Secretary, be used as the identifying number for such individual for purposes of this title.”

In William R. and Lenore C. Larsen Petitioners v COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent, T.C. No. 2008-170, UNITED STATES TAX COURT Docket No. 5631-06. Filed July 17, 2008, the Respondent conceded dependency exemptions and child tax credits without SSN’s.

According to Webster’s Dictionary;
conceded transitive verb 1: to grant as a right or privilege 2 a: to accept as true, valid, or accurate b: to acknowledge grudgingly or hesitantly intransitive verb: to make concession : yield.

This is all nonsense. Sorry. No Magikal Incantations of misunderstood legalistic concepts will free you from the omnipotent state.

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