Comment: It took a few minutes to reply because I had to prepare that

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It took a few minutes to reply because I had to prepare that

previous post. I deal in the world of principles, not deviations of language.

There is a reason legislatures do not precisely define terms. It is so they can be applied as broadly as possible. As a matter of fact, the absence of a precise definition from a legislature is prima facie evidence the term was intended to be applied as broadly as possible.

I didn't read the whole thing but obviously the Texas codes read more sensibly. However none of the language is going to change any principles. The principle is "ignorantia juris non excusat" translating to "ignorance of the law does not excuse."

It is axiomatically impossible for law to be a 100% privileged activity because if that were true the principle ignorance does not excuse can not be true. So the question becomes what percentage of law is privileged and what percentage of law is not privileged.

If one reviews case law they will find some consistencies:

1. Is the activity complained of practicing law?
2. Is it a permissible activity even if an unlicensed practice of law (ie. pro se)?

A further review will find even more consistency to how those questions are answered and underneath all the linguistics bullshit of different courts applying those same questions in different circumstances a pattern becomes plain as day which is that codes and statues are a form of intellectual property and if one seeks to derive a gain or profit using codes or statutes they must obtain permission of the owner which is what is being called a "license to practice law" using undefined ambiguous language.