Comment: Missing Constitution

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Missing Constitution

The missing constitution is the one offered by roughly half of the so called Founding Fathers Monopoly.

Declaration of Independence (duty of people to defend against criminal governments)

The so called Founding Fathers Constitution of 1787 (defending against criminal governments is now against the law)

What is missing?

The Articles of Confederation

In between 1776 and 1787 are events that worked under a Federated group of Constitutional Republics.

Some homework for those who still believe in a Founding Fathers Monopoly (one instead of two, where one is genuine and the other is counterfeit)

Group A (genuine defenders of Liberty)

Group B (counterfeiters)

The genuine founders of effective defense of Liberty were, by their actions, Federalists: meaning that they advocated and then produced a Federation of Constitutional Republics under The Articles of Confederation.

What was Group A called by the corporate monopoly media of the day?

The genuine effective defenders of Liberty, those advocating Federation, where called, in print media, Anti-Federalists.


"Mr. Chairman—Whether the Constitution be good or bad, the present clause clearly discovers, that it is a National Government, and no longer a confederation. I mean that clause which gives the first hint of the General Government laying direct taxes. The assumption of this power of laying direct taxes, does of itself, entirely change the confederation of the States into one consolidated Government. This power being at discretion, unconfined, and without any kind of controul, must carry every thing before it. The very idea of converting what was formerly confederation, to a consolidated Government, is totally subversive of every principle which has hitherto governed us. This power is calculated to annihilate totally the State Governments. Will the people of this great community submit to be individually taxed by two different and distinct powers? Will they suffer themselves to be doubly harrassed? These two concurrent powers cannot exist long together; the one will destroy the other: The General Government being paramount to, and in every respect more powerful than, the State governments, the latter must give way to the former. Is it to be supposed that one National Government will suit so extensive a country, embracing so many climates, and containing inhabitants so very different in manners, habits, and customs? It is ascertained by history, that there never was a Government, over a very extensive country, without destroying the liberties of the people: History also, supported by the opinions of the best writers, shew us, that monarchy may suit a large territory, and despotic Governments ever so extensive t a country; but that popular Governments can only exist in small territories —Is there a single example, on the face of the earth, to support t a contrary opinion? Where is there one exception to this general rule? Was there ever an instance of a general National Government extending over so extensive a country, abounding in such a variety of climates, where the people retained their liberty? I solemnly declare that no man is a greater friend to a firm Union of the American States than I am: But, Sir, if this great end can be obtained without hazarding the rights of the people, why should we recur to such dangerous principles? Requisitions have been often refused, sometimes from an impossibility of complying with them; often from that great variety of circumstances which retard the collection of monies, and, perhaps, sometimes from a wilful design of procrastinating. But why shall we give up to the National Government this power, so dangerous in its nature, and for which its members will not have sufficient information—Is it not well known, that what would be a proper tax in one State would be grievous in another? The Gentleman [George Nicholas] who hath favored us with an eulogium in favor of this system, must, after all the encomiums he has been pleased to bestow upon it, acknowledge, that our Federal Representatives must be unacquainted with the situation of their constituents: Sixty-five members cannot possibly know the situation and circumstances of all the inhabitants of this immense continent: When a certain sum comes to be taxed, and the mode of levying to be fixed, they will lay the tax on that article which t will be most productive, and easiest in the collection, without consulting the real circumstances or convenience of a country, with which, in fact, they cannot be sufficiently acquainted. The mode of levying I taxes is of the utmost consequence, and yet here it is to be determined by those who have neither knowledge of our situation, nor a common interest with us, nor a fellow feeling for us:—The subjects of taxation differ in three-fourths; nay, I might say with truth, in four-fifths of the States—If we trust the National Government with an effectual way of raising the necessary sums, ’tis sufficient; every thing we do furtheris trusting the happiness and rights of the people: Why then should we give up this dangerous power of individual taxation?"

The counterfeiters called themselves Federalists in their Federalist Papers (fraud or commonly known as "campaign promises")


"But Hamilton wanted to go farther than debt assumption. He believed a funded national debt would assist in establishing public credit. By funding national debt, Hamilton envisioned the Congress setting aside a portion of tax revenues to pay each year's interest without an annual appropriation. Redemption of the principal would be left to the government's discretion. At the time Hamilton gave his Report on Public Credit, the national debt was $80 million. Though such a large figure shocked many Republicans who saw debt as a menace to be avoided, Hamilton perceived debt's benefits. "In countries in which the national debt is properly funded, and the object of established confidence," explained Hamilton, "it assumes most of the purposes of money." Federal stock would be issued in exchange for state and national debt certificates, with interest on the stock running about 4.5 percent. To Republicans the debt proposals were heresy. The farmers and planters of the South, who were predominantly Republican, owed enormous sums to British creditors and thus had firsthand knowledge of the misery wrought by debt. Debt, as Hamilton himself noted, must be paid or credit is ruined. High levels of taxation, Republicans prognosticated, would be necessary just to pay the interest on the perpetual debt. Believing that this tax burden would fall on the yeoman farmers and eventually rise to European levels, Republicans opposed Hamilton's debt program.
"To help pay the interest on the debt, Hamilton convinced the Congress to pass an excise on whiskey. In Federalist N. 12, Hamilton noted that because "[t]he genius of the people will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise law," such taxes would be little used by the national government.

"In power, the Secretary of the Treasury soon changed his mind and the tax on the production of whiskey rankled Americans living on the frontier. Cash was scarce in the West and the Frontiersmen used whiskey as an item of barter."

Daniel Shays, a Revolutionary War veteran, became a "Slave by Law" according to the criminals who took over the Constitutional Republic of Massachusetts under The Articles of Confederation.

Daniel Shays, a slave according to the criminals running the counterfeit government of Massachusetts ran from Massachusetts after failing to finalize the American Revolution. The criminals in Massachusetts demanded from the Governor of Vermont that those runaway slaves be returned. There was no legal authority to return runaway slaves under The Articles of Confederation because a Constitutional Republic under those rules could join, and pay taxes, or seceded and not pay taxes, into that investment FUND.

Is this beyond reasonable comprehension?

From that book on Virgina and Kentucky Resolutions are the following words of advice and warning:

Second, federalism permits the states to operate as laboratories of democracy-to experiment with various policies and Programs. For example, if Tennessee wanted to provide a state-run health system for its citizens, the other 49 states could observe the effects of this venture on Tennessee's economy, the quality of care provided, and the overall cost of health care. If the plan proved to be efficacious other states might choose to emulate it, or adopt a plan taking into account any problems surfacing in Tennessee. If the plan proved to be a disastrous intervention, the other 49 could decide to leave the provision of medical care to the private sector. With national plans and programs, the national officials simply roll the dice for all 284 million people of the United States and hope they get things right.

Experimentation in policymaking also encourages a healthy competition among units of government and allows the people to vote with their feet should they find a law of policy detrimental to their interests. Using again the state-run health system as an example, if a citizen of Tennessee was unhappy with Tennessee's meddling with the provisions of health care, the citizen could move to a neighboring state. Reallocation to a state like North Carolina, with a similar culture and climate, would not be a dramatic shift and would be a viable option. Moreover, if enough citizens exercised this option, Tennessee would be pressured to abandon its foray into socialized medicine, or else lose much of its tax base. To escape a national health system, a citizen would have to emigrate to a foreign country, an option far less appealing and less likely to be exercised than moving to a neighboring state. Without competition from other units of government,the national government would have much less incentive than Tennessee would to modify the objectionable policy. Clearly, the absence of experimentation and competition hampers the creation of effective programs and makes the modification of failed national programs less likely. ______________________________________________________

A Voluntary Association (Federation of Sovereign Republics) cannot enforce an Involuntary Association (Monopoly of counterfeiting) because the targeted victims refuse to be victims.

Is that not simple?