Rebuilding America's Defense Strategy Pre 9-11 NeoCon strategy

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R EBUILDING A MERICA ’ S D EFENSES Strategy, Forces and ResourcesFor a New Century A Report of The Project for the New American Century September 2000
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A BOUT THE P ROJECT FOR THE N EW A MERICAN C ENTURY Established in the spring of 1997, the Project for the New American Century is a non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership.The Project is an initiative of the New Citizenship Project. William Kristol is chairmanof the Project, and Robert Kagan, Devon Gaffney Cross, Bruce P. Jackson and John R.Bolton serve as directors. Gary Schmitt is executive director of the Project.“As the 20 th century draws to a close, the United States stands as theworld’s most preeminent power. Having led the West to victory inthe Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Doesthe United States have the vision to build upon the achievement ofpast decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape anew century favorable to American principles and interests?“[What we require is] a military that is strong and ready to meetboth present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly andpurposefully promotes American principles abroad; and nationalleadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities.“Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises itspower. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of globalleadership of the costs that are associated with its exercise. Americahas a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia,and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invitechallenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20 th century should have taught us that it is important to shapecircumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before theybecome dire. The history of the past century should have taught usto embrace the cause of American leadership.”– From the Project’s founding Statement of Principles ____P ROJECT FOR THE N EW A MERICAN C ENTURY ____ 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 510, Washington, D.C. 20036Telephone: (202) 293-4983 / Fax: (202) 293-4572
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R EBUILDING A MERICA ’ S D EFENSES Strategy, Forces and ResourcesFor a New Century D ONALD K AGAN G ARY S CHMITT Project Co-ChairmenT HOMAS D ONNELLY Principal Author
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R EBUILDING A MERICA ’ S D EFENSES Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century C ONTENTSIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iKey Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ivI. Why Another Defense Review? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1II. Four Essential Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5III. Repositioning Today’s Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14IV. Rebuilding Today’s Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22V. Creating Tomorrow’s Dominant Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50VI. Defense Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69Project Participants
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century i I NTRODUCTION The Project for the New AmericanCentury was established in the spring of1997. From its inception, the Project hasbeen concerned with the decline in thestrength of America’s defenses, and in theproblems this would create for the exerciseof American leadership around the globeand, ultimately, for the preservation ofpeace.Our concerns were reinforced by thetwo congressionally-mandated defensestudies that appeared soon thereafter: thePentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review(May 1997) and the report of the NationalDefense Panel (December 1997). Bothstudies assumed that U.S. defense budgetswould remain flat or continue to shrink. Asa result, the defense plans andrecommendations outlined in the two reportswere fashioned with such budget constraintsin mind. Broadly speaking, the QDRstressed current military requirements at theexpense of future defense needs, while theNDP’s report emphasized future needs byunderestimating today’s defenseresponsibilities.Although the QDR and the report of theNDP proposed different policies, theyshared one underlying feature: the gapbetween resources and strategy should beresolved not by increasing resources but byshortchanging strategy. America’s armedforces, it seemed, could either prepare forthe future by retreating from its role as theessential defender of today’s global securityorder, or it could take care of currentbusiness but be unprepared for tomorrow’sthreats and tomorrow’s battlefields.Either alternative seemed to usshortsighted. The United States is theworld’s only superpower, combiningpreeminent military power, globaltechnological leadership, and the world’slargest economy. Moreover, America standsat the head of a system of alliances whichincludes the world’s other leadingdemocratic powers. At present the UnitedStates faces no global rival. America’sgrand strategy should aim to preserve andextend this advantageous position as far intothe future as possible. There are, however,potentially powerful states dissatisfied withthe current situation and eager to change it,if they can, in directions that endanger therelatively peaceful, prosperous and freecondition the world enjoys today. Up tonow, they have been deterred from doing soby the capability and global presence ofAmerican military power. But, as thatpower declines, relatively and absolutely,the happy conditions that follow from it willbe inevitably undermined.Preserving the desirable strategicsituation in which the United States nowfinds itself requires a globally preeminentmilitary capability both today and in thefuture. But years of cuts in defensespending have eroded the Americanmilitary’s combat readiness, and put injeopardy the Pentagon’s plans formaintaining military superiority in the yearsahead. Increasingly, the U.S. military hasfound itself undermanned, inadequatelyequipped and trained, straining to handlecontingency operations, and ill-prepared toadapt itself to the revolution in militaryaffairs. Without a well-conceived defensepolicy and an appropriate increase in
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century ii At present theUnited Statesfaces noglobal rival.America’sgrand strategyshould aim topreserve andextend thisadvantageousposition as farinto the futureas possible. defense spending, the United States has beenletting its ability to take full advantage of theremarkable strategic opportunity at hand slipaway.With this in mind, we began a project inthe spring of 1998 to examine the country’sdefense plans and resource requirements.We started from the premise that U.S.military capabilities should be sufficient tosupport an American grand strategycommitted to building upon thisunprecedented opportunity. We did notaccept pre-ordained constraints thatfollowed from assumptions about what thecountry might or might not be willing toexpend on its defenses.In broad terms, we saw the project asbuilding upon the defense strategy outlinedby the Cheney Defense Department in thewaning days of the Bush Administration.The Defense Policy Guidance (DPG) draftedin the early monthsof 1992 provided ablueprint formaintaining U.S.preeminence,precluding the riseof a great powerrival, and shapingthe internationalsecurity order inline with Americanprinciples andinterests. Leakedbefore it had beenformally approved,the document wascriticized as aneffort by “coldwarriors” to keep defense spending high andcuts in forces small despite the collapse ofthe Soviet Union; not surprisingly, it wassubsequently buried by the newadministration.Although the experience of the pasteight years has modified our understandingof particular military requirements forcarrying out such a strategy, the basic tenetsof the DPG, in our judgment, remain sound.And what Secretary Cheney said at the timein response to the DPG’s critics remains truetoday: “We can either sustain the [armed]forces we require and remain in a position tohelp shape things for the better, or we canthrow that advantage away. [But] thatwould only hasten the day when we facegreater threats, at higher costs and furtherrisk to American lives.”The project proceeded by holding aseries of seminars. We asked outstandingdefense specialists to write papers to explorea variety of topics: the future missions andrequirements of the individual militaryservices, the role of the reserves, nuclearstrategic doctrine and missile defenses, thedefense budget and prospects for militarymodernization, the state (training andreadiness) of today’s forces, the revolutionin military affairs, and defense-planning fortheater wars, small wars and constabularyoperations. The papers were circulated to agroup of participants, chosen for theirexperience and judgment in defense affairs.(The list of participants may be found at theend of this report.) Each paper then becamethe basis for discussion and debate. Ourgoal was to use the papers to assistdeliberation, to generate and test ideas, andto assist us in developing our final report.While each paper took as its starting point ashared strategic point of view, we made noattempt to dictate the views or direction ofthe individual papers. We wanted as fulland as diverse a discussion as possible.Our report borrows heavily from thosedeliberations. But we did not ask seminarparticipants to “sign-off” on the final report.We wanted frank discussions and we soughtto avoid the pitfalls of trying to produce aconsensual but bland product. We wanted totry to define and describe a defense strategythat is honest, thoughtful, bold, internallyconsistent and clear. And we wanted tospark a serious and informed discussion, theessential first step for reaching soundconclusions and for gaining public support.
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century iii New circumstances make us think thatthe report might have a more receptiveaudience now than in recent years. For thefirst time since the late 1960s the federalgovernment is running a surplus. For mostof the 1990s, Congress and the White Housegave balancing the federal budget a higherpriority than funding national security. Infact, to a significant degree, the budget wasbalanced by a combination of increased taxrevenues and cuts in defense spending. Thesurplus expected in federal revenues overthe next decade, however, removes any needto hold defense spending to somepreconceived low level.Moreover, the American public and itselected representatives have becomeincreasingly aware of the declining state ofthe U.S. military. News stories, Pentagonreports, congressional testimony andanecdotal accounts from members of thearmed services paint a disturbing picture ofan American military that is troubled bypoor enlistment and retention rates, shoddyhousing, a shortage of spare parts andweapons, and diminishing combat readiness.Finally, this report comes after adecade’s worth of experience in dealing withthe post-Cold War world. Previous effortsto fashion a defense strategy that wouldmake sense for today’s security environmentwere forced to work from many untestedassumptions about the nature of a worldwithout a superpower rival. We have amuch better idea today of what ourresponsibilities are, what the threats to usmight be in this new security environment,and what it will take to secure the relativepeace and stability. We believe our reportreflects and benefits from that decade’sworth of experience.Our report is published in a presidentialelection year. The new administration willneed to produce a second QuadrennialDefense Review shortly after it takes office.We hope that the Project’s report will beuseful as a road map for the nation’simmediate and future defense plans. Webelieve we have set forth a defense programthat is justified by the evidence, rests on anhonest examination of the problems andpossibilities, and does not flinch from facingthe true cost of security. We hope it willinspire careful consideration and seriousdiscussion. The post-Cold War world willnot remain a relatively peaceful place if wecontinue to neglect foreign and defensematters. But serious attention, carefulthought, and the willingness to devoteadequate resources to maintainingAmerica’s military strength can make theworld safer and American strategic interestsmore secure now and in the future. Donald Kagan Gary SchmittProject Co-ChairmenThomas DonnellyPrincipal Author
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century iv K EY F INDINGS This report proceeds from the belief thatAmerica should seek to preserve and extendits position of global leadership bymaintaining the preeminence of U.S.military forces. Today, the United Stateshas an unprecedented strategic opportunity.It faces no immediate great-powerchallenge; it is blessed with wealthy,powerful and democratic allies in every partof the world; it is in the midst of the longesteconomic expansion in its history; and itspolitical and economic principles are almostuniversally embraced. At no time in historyhas the international security order been asconducive to American interests and ideals.The challenge for the coming century is topreserve and enhance this “Americanpeace.”Yet unless the United States maintainssufficient military strength, this opportunitywill be lost. And in fact, over the pastdecade, the failure to establish a securitystrategy responsive to new realities and toprovide adequate resources for the full rangeof missions needed to exercise U.S. globalleadership has placed the American peace atgrowing risk. This report attempts to definethose requirements. In particular, we needto:E STABLISH FOUR CORE MISSIONS for U.S. military forces: • defend the American homeland;• fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars;• perform the “constabulary” duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions; • transform U.S. forces to exploit the “revolution in military affairs;” To carry out these core missions, we need to provide sufficient force and budgetaryallocations. In particular, the United States must:M AINTAIN NUCLEAR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY , basing the U.S. nuclear deterrent upon aglobal, nuclear net assessment that weighs the full range of current and emerging threats,not merely the U.S.-Russia balance.R ESTORE THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH of today’s force to roughly the levels anticipated inthe “Base Force” outlined by the Bush Administration, an increase in active-duty strengthfrom 1.4 million to 1.6 million.R EPOSITION U.S. FORCES to respond to 21 st century strategic realities by shiftingpermanently-based forces to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia, and by changing navaldeployment patterns to reflect growing U.S. strategic concerns in East Asia.
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century v M ODERNIZE CURRENT U.S. FORCES SELECTIVELY , proceeding with the F-22 program whileincreasing purchases of lift, electronic support and other aircraft; expanding submarineand surface combatant fleets; purchasing Comanche helicopters and medium-weightground vehicles for the Army, and the V-22 Osprey “tilt-rotor” aircraft for the MarineCorps.C ANCEL “ ROADBLOCK ” PROGRAMS such as the Joint Strike Fighter, CVX aircraft carrier,and Crusader howitzer system that would absorb exorbitant amounts of Pentagon fundingwhile providing limited improvements to current capabilities. Savings from these canceledprograms should be used to spur the process of military transformation.D EVELOP AND DEPLOY GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSES to defend the American homeland andAmerican allies, and to provide a secure basis for U.S. power projection around the world.C ONTROL THE NEW “ INTERNATIONAL COMMONS ” OF SPACE AND “ CYBERSPACE ,” and pavethe way for the creation of a new military service – U.S. Space Forces – with the mission ofspace control.E XPLOIT THE “ REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS ” to insure the long-term superiority ofU.S. conventional forces. Establish a two-stage transformation process which • maximizes the value of current weapons systems through the application of advanced technologies, and, • produces more profound improvements in military capabilities, encourages competition between single services and joint-service experimentation efforts.I NCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING gradually to a minimum level of 3.5 to 3.8 percent of grossdomestic product, adding $15 billion to $20 billion to total defense spending annually.Fulfilling these requirements is essentialif America is to retain its militarily dominantstatus for the coming decades. Conversely,the failure to meet any of these needs mustresult in some form of strategic retreat. Atcurrent levels of defense spending, the onlyoption is to try ineffectually to “manage”increasingly large risks: paying for today’sneeds by shortchanging tomorrow’s;withdrawing from constabulary missions toretain strength for large-scale wars;“choosing” between presence in Europe orpresence in Asia; and so on. These are badchoices. They are also false economies.The “savings” from withdrawing from theBalkans, for example, will not free upanywhere near the magnitude of fundsneeded for military modernization ortransformation. But these are falseeconomies in other, more profound ways aswell. The true cost of not meeting ourdefense requirements will be a lessenedcapacity for American global leadership and,ultimately, the loss of a global security orderthat is uniquely friendly to Americanprinciples and prosperity.
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 1 IW HY A NOTHER D EFENSE R EVIEW ? Since the end of the Cold War, theUnited States has struggled to formulate acoherent national security or militarystrategy, one that accounts for the constantsof American power and principles yetaccommodates 21 st century realities. Absenta strategic framework, U.S. defense plan-ning has been an empty and increasinglyself-referential exercise, often dominated bybureaucratic and budgetary rather thanstrategic interests. Indeed, the proliferationof defense reviews over the past decadetestifies to the failure to chart a consistentcourse: to date, there have been half a dozenformal defense reviews, and the Pentagon isnow gearing up for a second QuadrennialDefense Review in 2001. Unless this “QDRII” matches U.S. military forces andresources to a viable American strategy, it,too, will fail.These failures are not without cost:already, they place at risk an historicopportunity. After the victories of the pastcentury – two world wars, the Cold War andmost recently the Gulf War – the UnitedStates finds itself as the uniquely powerfulleader of a coalition of free and prosperousstates that faces no immediate great-powerchallenge.The American peace has proven itselfpeaceful, stable and durable. It has, over thepast decade, provided the geopoliticalframework for widespread economic growthand the spread of American principles ofliberty and democracy. Yet no moment ininternational politics can be frozen in time;even a global Pax Americana will notpreserve itself.Paradoxically, as American power andinfluence are at their apogee, Americanmilitary forces limp toward exhaustion,unable to meet the demands of their manyand varied missions, including preparing fortomorrow’s battlefield. Today’s force,reduced by a third or more over the pastdecade, suffers from degraded combatreadiness; from difficulties in recruiting andretaining sufficient numbers of soldiers,sailors, airmen and Marines; from the effectsof an extended “procurement holiday” thathas resulted in the premature aging of mostweapons systems; from an increasinglyobsolescent and inadequate militaryinfrastructure; from a shrinking industrialbase poorly structured to be the “arsenal ofdemocracy” for the 21 st century; from a lackof innovation that threatens the techno-logical and operational advantages enjoyedby U.S. forces for a generation and uponwhich American strategy depends. Finally,and most dangerously, the social fabric ofthe military is frayed and worn. U.S. armedforces suffer from a degraded quality of lifedivorced from middle-class expectations,upon which an all-volunteer force depends.Enlisted men and women and junior officersincreasingly lack confidence in their seniorleaders, whom they believe will not tellunpleasant truths to their civilian leaders. Insum, as the American peace reaches acrossthe globe, the force that preserves that peaceis increasingly overwhelmed by its tasks.This is no paradox; it is the inevitableconsequence of the failure to match militarymeans to geopolitical ends. Underlying thefailed strategic and defense reviews of thepast decade is the idea that the collapse of
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 2 The multiple challenges of thepost-Cold War world. the Soviet Union had created a “strategicpause.” In other words, until another great-power challenger emerges, the United Statescan enjoy a respite from the demands ofinternational leadership. Like a boxerbetween championship bouts, America canafford to relax and live the good life, certainthat there would be enough time to shape upfor the next big challenge. Thus the UnitedStates could afford to reduce its militaryforces, close bases overseas, halt majorweapons programs and reap the financialbenefits of the “peace dividend.” But as wehave seen over the past decade, there hasbeen no shortage of powers around theworld who have taken the collapse of theSoviet empire as an opportunity to expandtheir own influence and challenge theAmerican-led security order.Beyond the faulty notion of a strategicpause, recent defense reviews have sufferedfrom an inverted understanding of the mili-tary dimension of the Cold War strugglebetween the United States and the SovietUnion. American containment strategy didnot proceed from the assumption that theCold War would be a purely military strug-gle, in which the U.S. Army matched theRed Army tank for tank; rather, the UnitedStates would seek to deter the Sovietsmilitarily while defeating them economi-cally and ideologically over time. And,even within the realm of military affairs, thepractice of deterrence allowed for what inmilitary terms is called “an economy offorce.” The principle job of NATO forces,for example, was to deter an invasion ofWestern Europe, not to invade and occupythe Russian heartland. Moreover, the bi-polar nuclear balance of terror made boththe United States and the Soviet Uniongenerally cautious. Behind the smallestproxy war in the most remote region lurkedthe possibility of Armageddon. Thus,despite numerous miscalculations throughthe five decades of Cold War, the UnitedStates reaped an extraordinary measure ofglobal security and stability simply bybuilding a credible and, in relative terms,inexpensive nuclear arsenal.Over the decade of the post-Cold-Warperiod, however, almost everything haschanged. The Cold War world was a bipolarworld; the 21 st century world is – for themoment, at least – decidedly unipolar, withAmerica as the world’s “sole superpower.”America’s strategic goal used to becontainment of the Soviet Union; today thetask is to preserve an international securityenvironment conducive to Americaninterests and ideals. The military’s jobduring the Cold War was to deter Sovietexpansionism. Today its task is to secureand expand the “zones of democraticpeace;” to deter the rise of a new great-power competitor; defend key regions ofEurope, East Asia and the Middle East; andto preserve American preeminence throughthe coming transformation of war madeCold War 21 st CenturySecuritysystemBipolar UnipolarStrategicgoalContainSovietUnionPreserve PaxAmericanaMainmilitarymission(s)Deter SovietexpansionismSecure andexpand zonesof democraticpeace; deterrise of newgreat-powercompetitor;defend keyregions;exploittransformationof warMainmilitarythreat(s)Potentialglobal waracross manytheatersPotentialtheater warsspread acrossglobeFocus ofstrategiccompetitionEuropeEast Asia
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 3 Today, Americaspends less than3 percent of itsgross domesticproduct onnational defense,less than at anytime since beforethe United Statesestablished itselfas the world’sleading power. possible by new technologies. From 1945 to1990, U.S. forces prepared themselves for asingle, global war that might be foughtacross many theaters; in the new century, theprospect is for a variety of theater warsaround the world, against separate anddistinct adversaries pursuing separate anddistinct goals. During the Cold War, themain venue of superpower rivalry, thestrategic “center of gravity,” was in Europe,where large U.S. and NATO conventionalforces prepared to repulse a Soviet attackand over which nuclear war might begin;and with Europe now generally at peace, thenew strategic center of concern appears tobe shifting to East Asia. The missions forAmerica’s armedforces have notdiminished somuch as shifted.The threats maynot be as great,but there aremore of them.During the ColdWar, Americaacquired itssecurity“wholesale” byglobal deterrenceof the SovietUnion. Today,that samesecurity can only be acquired at the “retail”level, by deterring or, when needed, bycompelling regional foes to act in ways thatprotect American interests and principles.This gap between a diverse andexpansive set of new strategic realities anddiminishing defense forces and resourcesdoes much to explain why the Joint Chiefsof Staff routinely declare that they see “highrisk” in executing the missions assigned toU.S. armed forces under the government’sdeclared national military strategy. Indeed,a JCS assessment conducted at the height ofthe Kosovo air war found the risk level“unacceptable.” Such risks are the result ofthe combination of the new missionsdescribed above and the dramaticallyreduced military force that has emergedfrom the defense “drawdown” of the pastdecade. Today, America spends less than 3percent of its gross domestic product onnational defense, less than at any time sincebefore World War II – in other words, sincebefore the United States established itself asthe world’s leading power – and a cut from4.7 percent of GDP in 1992, the first realpost-Cold-War defense budget. Most of thisreduction has come under the ClintonAdministration; despite initial promises toapproximate the level of defense spendingcalled for in the final Bush Administrationprogram, President Clinton cut more than$160 billion from the Bush program from1992 to 1996 alone. Over the first sevenyears of the Clinton Administration,approximately $426 billion in defenseinvestments have been deferred, creating aweapons procurement “bow wave” ofimmense proportions.The most immediate effect of reduceddefense spending has been a precipitatedecline in combat readiness. Across allservices, units are reporting degradedreadiness, spare parts and personnelshortages, postponed and simplified trainingregimens, and many other problems. Incongressional testimony, service chiefs ofstaff now routinely report that their forcesare inadequate to the demands of the “two-war” national military strategy. Pressattention focused on these readinessproblems when it was revealed that twoArmy divisions were given a “C-4” rating,meaning they were not ready for war. Yet itwas perhaps more telling that none of theArmy’s ten divisions achieved the highest“C-1” rating, reflecting the widespreadeffects of slipping readiness standards. Bycontrast, every division that deployed toOperation Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991received a “C-1” rating. This is just asnapshot that captures the state of U.S.armed forces today.These readiness problems areexacerbated by the fact that U.S. forces arepoorly positioned to respond to today’s
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 4 crises. In Europe, for example, theoverwhelming majority of Army and AirForce units remain at their Cold War basesin Germany or England, while the securityproblems on the continent have moved toSoutheast Europe. Temporary rotations offorces to the Balkans and elsewhere inSoutheast Europe increase the overallburdens of these operations many times.Likewise, the Clinton Administration hascontinued the fiction that the operations ofAmerican forces in the Persian Gulf aremerely temporary duties. Nearly a decadeafter the Gulf War, U.S. air, ground andnaval forces continue to protect enduringAmerican interests in the region. In additionto rotational naval forces, the Armymaintains what amounts to an armoredbrigade in Kuwait for nine months of everyyear; the Air Force has two composite airwings in constant “no-fly zone” operationsover northern and southern Iraq. Anddespite increasing worries about the rise ofChina and instability in Southeast Asia, U.S.forces are found almost exclusively inNortheast Asian bases.Yet for all its problems in carrying outtoday’s missions, the Pentagon has donealmost nothing to prepare for a future thatpromises to be very different and potentiallymuch more dangerous. It is now commonlyunderstood that information and other newtechnologies – as well as widespreadtechnological and weapons proliferation –are creating a dynamic that may threatenAmerica’s ability to exercise its dominantmilitary power. Potential rivals such asChina are anxious to exploit these trans-formational technologies broadly, whileadversaries like Iran, Iraq and North Koreaare rushing to develop ballistic missiles andnuclear weapons as a deterrent to Americanintervention in regions they seek todominate. Yet the Defense Department andthe services have done little more than affixa “transformation” label to programsdeveloped during the Cold War, whilediverting effort and attention to a process ofjoint experimentation which restricts ratherthan encourages innovation. Rather thanadmit that rapid technological changesmakes it uncertain which new weaponssystems to develop, the armed services clingever more tightly to traditional program andconcepts. As Andrew Krepinevich, amember of the National Defense Panel, putit in a recent study of Pentagon experi-mentation, “Unfortunately, the DefenseDepartment’s rhetoric asserting the need formilitary transformation and its support forjoint experimentation has yet to be matchedby any great sense of urgency or anysubstantial resource support.…At presentthe Department’s effort is poorly focusedand woefully underfunded.”In sum, the 1990s have been a “decadeof defense neglect.” This leaves the nextpresident of the United States with anenormous challenge: he must increasemilitary spending to preserve Americangeopolitical leadership, or he must pull backfrom the security commitments that are themeasure of America’s position as theworld’s sole superpower and the finalguarantee of security, democratic freedomsand individual political rights. This choicewill be among the first to confront thepresident: new legislation requires theincoming administration to fashion anational security strategy within six monthsof assuming office, as opposed to waiting afull year, and to complete anotherquadrennial defense review three monthsafter that. In a larger sense, the newpresident will choose whether today’s“unipolar moment,” to use columnistCharles Krauthammer’s phrase forAmerica’s current geopolitical preeminence,will be extended along with the peace andprosperity that it provides.This study seeks to frame these choicesclearly, and to re-establish the links betweenU.S. foreign policy, security strategy, forceplanning and defense spending. If anAmerican peace is to be maintained, andexpanded, it must have a secure foundationon unquestioned U.S. military preeminence.
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 5 None of thedefense reviewsof the pastdecade hasweighed fullythe range ofmissionsdemanded byU.S. globalleadership, noradequatelyquantified theforces andresourcesnecessary toexecute thesemissionssuccessfully. IIF OUR E SSENTIAL M ISSIONS America’s global leadership, and its roleas the guarantor of the current great-powerpeace, relies upon the safety of theAmerican homeland; the preservation of afavorable balance of power in Europe, theMiddle East and surrounding energy-producing region, and East Asia; and thegeneral stability of the international systemof nation-states relative to terrorists,organized crime, and other “non-stateactors.” The relative importance of theseelements, and the threats to U.S. interests,may rise and fall over time. Europe, forexample, is now extraordinarily peacefuland stable, despite the turmoil in theBalkans. Conversely, East Asia appears tobe entering a period with increased potentialfor instability and competition. In the Gulf,American power and presence has achievedrelative external security for U.S. allies, butthe longer-term prospects are murkier.Generally, American strategy for the comingdecades should seek to consolidate the greatvictories won in the 20 th century – whichhave made Germany and Japan into stabledemocracies, for example – maintainstability in the Middle East, while setting theconditions for 21 st -century successes,especially in East Asia.A retreat from any one of theserequirements would call America’s status asthe world’s leading power into question. Aswe have seen, even a small failure like thatin Somalia or a halting and incompletetriumph as in the Balkans can cast doubt onAmerican credibility. The failure to define acoherent global security and militarystrategy during the post-Cold-War periodhas invited challenges; states seeking toestablish regional hegemony continue toprobe for the limits of the American securityperimeter. None of the defense reviews ofthe past decade has weighed fully the rangeof missions demanded by U.S. globalleadership: defending the homeland,fighting andwinning multiplelarge-scale wars,conductingconstabularymissions whichpreserve thecurrent peace, andtransforming theU.S. armed forcesto exploit the“revolution inmilitary affairs.”Nor have theyadequatelyquantified theforces andresourcesnecessary toexecute thesemissionsseparately andsuccessfully.While muchfurther detailedanalysis would be required, it is the purposeof this study to outline the large, “full-spectrum” forces that are necessary toconduct the varied tasks demanded by astrategy of American preeminence for todayand tomorrow.
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 6 HOMELAND DEFENSE. America must defend its homeland. During the Cold War,nuclear deterrence was the key element in homeland defense; it remains essential. But thenew century has brought with it new challenges. While reconfiguring its nuclear force, theUnited States also must counteract the effects of the proliferation of ballistic missiles andweapons of mass destruction that may soon allow lesser states to deter U.S. military actionby threatening U.S. allies and the American homeland itself. Of all the new and currentmissions for U.S. armed forces, this must have priority.LARGE WARS. Second, the United States must retain sufficient forces able to rapidlydeploy and win multiple simultaneous large-scale wars and also to be able to respond tounanticipated contingencies in regions where it does not maintain forward-based forces.This resembles the “two-war” standard that has been the basis of U.S. force planning overthe past decade. Yet this standard needs to be updated to account for new realities andpotential new conflicts.CONSTABULARY DUTIES. Third, the Pentagon must retain forces to preserve thecurrent peace in ways that fall short of conduction major theater campaigns. A decade’sexperience and the policies of two administrations have shown that such forces must beexpanded to meet the needs of the new, long-term NATO mission in the Balkans, thecontinuing no-fly-zone and other missions in Southwest Asia, and other presence missions invital regions of East Asia. These duties are today’s most frequent missions, requiring forcesconfigured for combat but capable of long-term, independent constabulary operations.T RANSFORM U.S. A RMED F ORCES . Finally, the Pentagon must begin now to exploit the so-called “revolution in military affairs,” sparked by the introduction of advanced technologiesinto military systems; this must be regarded as a separate and critical mission worthy of ashare of force structure and defense budgets.Current American armed forces are ill-prepared to execute these four missions.Over the past decade, efforts to design andbuild effective missile defenses have beenill-conceived and underfunded, and theClinton Administration has proposed deepreductions in U.S. nuclear forces withoutsufficient analysis of the changing globalnuclear balance of forces. While, broadlyspeaking, the United States now maintainssufficient active and reserve forces to meetthe traditional two-war standard, this is trueonly in the abstract, under the mostfavorable geopolitical conditions. As theJoint Chiefs of Staff have admittedrepeatedly in congressional testimony, theylack the forces necessary to meet the two-war benchmark as expressed in the warplansof the regional commanders-in-chief. Therequirements for major-war forces must bereevaluated to accommodate new strategicrealities. One of these new realities is therequirement for peacekeeping operations;unless this requirement is better understood,America’s ability to fight major wars will bejeopardized. Likewise, the transformationprocess has gotten short shrift.To meet the requirements of the fournew missions highlighted above, the UnitedStates must undertake a two-stage process.The immediate task is to rebuild today’sforce, ensuring that it is equal to the tasksbefore it: shaping the peacetime enviro-nment and winning multiple, simultaneoustheater wars; these forces must be largeenough to accomplish these tasks withoutrunning the “high” or “unacceptable” risks itfaces now. The second task is to seriouslyembark upon a transformation of theDefense Department. This itself will be atwo-stage effort: for the next decade ormore, the armed forces will continue tooperate many of the same systems it now
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 7A new assessment of the globalnuclear balance, one that takesaccount of Chinese and other nuclearforces as well as Russian, mustprecede decisions about U.S. nuclearforce cuts. does, organize themselves in traditionalunits, and employ current operationalconcepts. However, this transition periodmust be a first step toward more substantialreform. Over the next several decades, theUnited States must field a global system ofmissile defenses, divine ways to control thenew “international commons” of space andcyberspace, and build new kinds ofconventional forces for different strategicchallenges and a new technologicalenvironment. Nuclear Forces Current conventional wisdom aboutstrategic forces in the post-Cold-War worldis captured in a comment made by the lateLes Aspin, the Clinton Administration's firstsecretary of defense. Aspin wrote that thecollapse of the Soviet Union had “literallyreversed U.S. interests in nuclear weapons”and, “Today, if offered the magic wand toeradicate the existence and knowledge ofnuclear weapons, we would very likelyaccept it.” Since the United States is theworld’s dominant conventional militarypower, this sentiment is understandable. Butit is precisely because we have such powerthat smaller adversarial states, looking for anequalizing advantage, are determined toacquire their own weapons of massdestruction. Whatever our fondest wishes,the reality of the today’s world is that thereis no magic wand with which to eliminatethese weapons (or, more fundamentally, theinterest in acquiring them) and that deterringtheir use requires a reliable and dominantU.S. nuclear capability.While the formal U.S. nuclear posturehas remained conservative through the 1994Nuclear Posture Review and the 1997Quadrennial Defense Review, and seniorPentagon leaders speak of the continuingneed for nuclear deterrent forces, the ClintonAdministration has taken repeated steps toundermine the readiness and effectiveness ofU.S. nuclear forces. In particular, it hasvirtually ceased development of safer andmore effective nuclear weapons; broughtunderground testing to a complete halt; andallowed the Department of Energy’sweapons complex and associated scientificexpertise to atrophy for lack of support. Theadministration has also made the decision toretain current weapons in the active force foryears beyond their design life. Whencombined with the decision to cut back onregular, non-nuclear flight and system testsof the weapons themselves, this raises a hostof questions about the continuing safety andreliability of the nation’s strategic arsenal.The administration’s stewardship of thenation's deterrent capability has been aptlydescribed by Congress as “erosion bydesign.”Rather than maintain and improveAmerica’s nuclear deterrent, the ClintonAdministration has put its faith in new armscontrol measures, most notably by signingthe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT). The treaty proposed a newmultilateral regime, consisting of some 150states, whose principal effect would be toconstrain America's unique role in providingthe global nuclear umbrella that helps tokeep states like Japan and South Korea fromdeveloping the weapons that are well withintheir scientific capability, while doing littleto stem nuclear weapons proliferation.Although the Senate refused to ratify thetreaty, the administration continues to abideby its basic strictures. And while it may
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 8 Theadministration’sstewardship ofthe nation’sdeterrentcapability hasbeen describedby Congress as“erosion bydesign.” make sense to continue the currentmoratorium on nuclear testing for themoment – since it would take a number ofyears to refurbish the neglected testinginfrastructure in any case – ultimately this isan untenable situation. If the United Statesis to have a nuclear deterrent that is botheffective and safe, it will need to test.That said, of all the elements of U.S.military force posture, perhaps none is morein need of reevaluation than America’snuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons remaina critical component of American militarypower but it is unclear whether the currentU.S. nuclear arsenal is well-suited to theemerging post-Cold War world. Today’sstrategic calculus encompasses more factorsthan just the balance of terror between theUnited States and Russia. U.S. nuclear forceplanning and related arms control policiesmust take account of a larger set of variablesthan in the past, including the growingnumber of smallnuclear arsenals –from North Koreato Pakistan to,perhaps soon,Iran and Iraq –and a modernizedand expandedChinese nuclearforce. Moreover,there is a questionabout the rolenuclear weaponsshould play indeterring the useof other kinds of weapons of mass destruc-tion, such as chemical and biological, withthe U.S. having foresworn those weapons’development and use. It addition, there maybe a need to develop a new family of nuclearweapons designed to address new sets ofmilitary requirements, such as would berequired in targeting the very deep under-ground, hardened bunkers that are beingbuilt by many of our potential adversaries.Nor has there been a serious analysis doneof the benefits versus the costs of maintain-ing the traditional nuclear “triad.” What isneeded first is a global net assessment ofwhat kinds and numbers of nuclear weaponsthe U.S. needs to meet its securityresponsibilities in a post-Soviet world.In short, until the Department ofDefense can better define future its nuclearrequirements, significant reductions in U.S.nuclear forces might well have unforeseenconsequences that lessen rather thanenhance the security of the United Statesand its allies. Reductions, upon review,might be called for. But what should finallydrive the size and character of our nuclearforces is not numerical parity with Russiancapabilities but maintaining Americanstrategic superiority – and, with thatsuperiority, a capability to deter possiblehostile coalitions of nuclear powers. U.S.nuclear superiority is nothing to be ashamedof; rather, it will be an essential element inpreserving American leadership in a morecomplex and chaotic world. Forces for Major Theater Wars The one constant of Pentagon forceplanning through the past decade has beenthe recognized need to retain sufficientcombat forces to fight and win, as rapidlyand decisively as possible, multiple, nearlysimultaneous major theater wars. Thisconstant is based upon two important truthsabout the current international order. One,the Cold-War standoff between America andits allies and the Soviet Union that made forcaution and discouraged direct aggressionagainst the major security interests of eitherside no longer exists. Two, conventionalwarfare remains a viable way for aggressivestates to seek major changes in theinternational order.Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait reflectedboth truths. The invasion would have beenhighly unlikely, if not impossible, within thecontext of the Cold War, and Iraq overranKuwait in a matter of hours. These twotruths revealed a third: maintaining orrestoring a favorable order in vital regions in
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 9 The Joint Chiefshave admittedthey lack theforces necessaryto meet the two-war benchmark. the world such as Europe, the Middle Eastand East Asia places a unique responsibilityon U.S. armed forces. The Gulf War andindeed the subsequent lesser wars in theBalkans could hardly have been fought andwon without the dominant role played byAmerican military might.Thus, the understanding that U.S. armedforces should be shaped by a “two-major-war” standard rightly has been accepted asthe core of America’s superpower statussince the end of the Cold War. The logic ofpast defense reviews still obtains, andreceived its clear exposition in the 1997Quadrennial Defense Review, which argued: A force sized and equipped fordeterring and defeating aggression inmore than one theater ensures that theUnited States will maintain theflexibility to cope with the unpredictableand unexpected. Such a capability isthe sine qua non of a superpower and isessential to the credibility of our overallnational security strategy….If theUnited States were to forego its abilityto defeat aggression in more than onetheater at a time, our standing as aglobal power, as the security partner ofchoice and the leader of theinternational community would becalled in to question. Indeed, someallies would undoubtedly read a one-war capability as a signal that theUnited States, if heavily engagedelsewhere, would no longer be able todefend their interests…A one-theater-war capacity would riskundermining…the credibility of U.S.security commitments in key regions ofthe world. This, in turn, could causeallies and friends to adopt moredivergent defense policies and postures,thereby weakening the web of alliancesand coalitions on which we rely toprotect our interests abroad. In short, anything less than a clear two-war capacity threatens to devolve into a no-war strategy.Unfortunately, Defense Departmentthinking about this requirement was frozenin the early 1990s. The experience ofOperation Allied Force in the Balkanssuggests that, if anything, the canonical two-war force-sizing standard is more likely tobe too low than too high. The Kosovo aircampaign eventually involved the level offorces anticipated for a major war, but in atheater other than the two – the Koreanpeninsula and Southwest Asia – that havegenerated past Pentagon planning scenarios.Moreover, new theater wars that can beforeseen, such as an American defense ofTaiwan against a Chinese invasion orpunitive attack, have yet to be formallyconsidered by Pentagon planners.To better judge forces needed forbuilding an American peace, the Pentagonneeds to begin to calculate the forcenecessary toprotect,independently,U.S. interestsin Europe, EastAsia and theGulf at alltimes. Theactions of ouradversaries in these regions bear no morethan a tangential relationship to one another;it is more likely that one of these regionalpowers will seize an opening created bydeployments of U.S. forces elsewhere tomake mischief.Thus, the major-theater-war standardshould remain the principal force-sizing toolfor U.S. conventional forces. This not to saythat this measure has been perfectly appliedin the past: Pentagon analyses have beenboth too optimistic and too pessimistic, byturns. For example, the analyses done of therequirement to defeat an Iraqi invasion ofKuwait and Saudi Arabia almost certainlyoverestimates the level of force required.Conversely, past analyses of a defense ofSouth Korea may have underestimated thedifficulties of such a war, especially if NorthKorea employed weapons of mass destruc-tion, as intelligence estimates anticipate.Moreover, the theater-war analysis done for
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 10The increasing number of‘constabulary’ missions for U.S.troops, such as in Kosovo above, mustbe considered an integral element inPentagon force planning. the QDR assumed that Kim Jong Il andSaddam Hussein each could begin a war –perhaps even while employing chemical,biological or even nuclear weapons – andthe United States would make no effort tounseat militarily either ruler. In both cases,past Pentagon wargames have given little orno consideration to the force requirementsnecessary not only to defeat an attack but toremove these regimes from power andconduct post-combat stability operations. Inshort, past Defense Department applicationof the two-war standard is not a reliableguide to the real force requirements – and,of course, past reviews included no analysisof the kind of campaign in Europe as wasseen in Operation Allied Force. Becausepast Pentagon strategy reviews have beenbudget-driven exercises, it will be necessaryto conduct fresh and more realistic analyseseven of the canonical two-war scenarios.In sum, while retaining the spirit of pastforce-planning for major wars, theDepartment of Defense must undertake amore nuanced and thoroughgoing review ofreal requirements. The truths that gave riseto the original two-war standard endure:America’s adversaries will continue to resistthe building of the American peace; whenthey see an opportunity as Saddam Husseindid in 1990, they will employ their mostpowerful armed forces to win on the battle-field what they could not win in peacefulcompetition; and American armed forceswill remain the core of efforts to deter,defeat, or remove from power regionalaggressors. Forces for ‘Constabulary’ Duties In addition to improving the analysisneeded to quantify the requirements formajor theater wars, the Pentagon also mustcome to grips with the real requirements forconstabulary missions. The 1997Quadrennial Defense Review rightlyacknowledged that these missions, which itdubbed “smaller-scale contingencies,” orSSCs, would be the frequent andunavoidable diet for U.S. armed forces formany years to come: “Based on recentexperience and intelligence projections, thedemand for SSC operations is expected toremain high over the next 15 to 20 years,”the review concluded. Yet, at the sametime, the QDR failed to allocate any forcesto these missions, continuing the fiction that,for force planning purposes, constabularymissions could be considered “lesserincluded cases” of major theater warrequirements. “U.S. forces must also beable to withdraw from SSC operations,reconstitute, and then deploy to a majortheater war in accordance with requiredtimelines,” the review argued.The shortcomings of this approach wereunderscored by the experience of OperationAllied Force in the Balkans. Preciselybecause the forces engaged there would nothave been able to withdraw, reconstitute andredeploy to another operation – and becausethe operation consumed such a large part ofoverall Air Force aircraft – the Joint Chiefsof Staff concluded that the United Stateswas running “unacceptable” risk in the eventof war elsewhere. Thus, facing up to therealities of multiple constabulary missionswill require a permanent allocation of U.S.armed forces.
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 11 Nor can the problem be solved bysimply withdrawing from currentconstabulary missions or by vowing to avoidthem in the future. Indeed, withdrawingfrom today’s ongoing missions would beproblematic. Although the no-fly-zone airoperations over northern and southern Iraqhave continued without pause for almost adecade, they remain an essential element inU.S. strategy and force posture in thePersian Gulf region. Ending these opera-tions would hand Saddam Hussein an impor-tant victory, something any American leaderwould be loath to do. Likewise, withdraw-ing from the Balkans would place Americanleadership in Europe – indeed, the viabilityof NATO – in question. While none ofthese operations involves a mortal threat,they do engage U.S. national securityinterests directly, as well as engagingAmerican moral interests.Further, these constabulary missions arefar more complex and likely to generateviolence than traditional “peacekeeping”missions. For one, they demand Americanpolitical leadership rather than that of theUnited Nations, as the failure of the UNmission in the Balkans and the relativesuccess of NATO operations there attests.Nor can the United States assume a UN-likestance of neutrality; the preponderance ofAmerican power is so great and its globalinterests so wide that it cannot pretend to beindifferent to the political outcome in theBalkans, the Persian Gulf or even when itdeploys forces in Africa. Finally, thesemissions demand forces basically configuredfor combat. While they also demandpersonnel with special language, logisticsand other support skills, the first order ofbusiness in missions such as in the Balkansis to establish security, stability and order.American troops, in particular, must beregarded as part of an overwhelminglypowerful force.With a decade’s worth of experienceboth of the requirements for currentconstabulary missions and with the chaoticpolitical environment of the post-Cold Warera, the Defense Department is more thanable to conduct a useful assessment toquantify the overall needs for forcesengaged in constabulary duties. While partof the solution lies in repositioning existingforces, there is no escaping the conclusionthat these new missions, unforeseen whenthe defense drawdown began a decade ago,require an increase in overall personnelstrength and U.S. force structure. Transformation Forces The fourth element in American forceposture – and certainly the one which holdsthe key to any longer-term hopes to extendthe current Pax Americana – is the missionto transform U.S. military forces to meetnew geopolitical and technologicalchallenges. While the prime directive fortransformation will be to design and deploya global missile defense system, the effectsof information and other advanced techno-logies promise to revolutionize the nature ofconventional armed forces. Moreover, theneed to create weapons systems optimizedfor operations in the Pacific theater willcreate requirements quite distinct from thecurrent generation of systems designed forwarfare on the European continent and thosenew systems like the F-22 fighter that alsowere developed to meet late-Cold-Warneeds.Although the basic concept for a systemof global missile defenses capable ofdefending the United States and its alliesagainst the threat of smaller and simplerballistic missiles has been well understoodsince the late 1980s, a decade has beensquandered in developing the requisitetechnologies. In fact, work on the keyelements of such a system, especially thosethat would operate in space, has either beenso slowed or halted completely, so that theprocess of deploying robust missile defensesremains a long-term project. If for no otherreason, the mission to create such a missiledefense system should be considered amatter of military transformation.
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 12 For the UnitedStates to retain thetechnological andtactical advan-tages it nowenjoys, thetransformationeffort must beconsidered aspressing a militarymission aspreparing fortoday’s theaterwars. As will be argued more fully below,effective ballistic missile defenses will bethe central element in the exercise ofAmerican power and the projection of U.S.military forces abroad. Without it, weakstates operating small arsenals of crudeballistic missiles, armed with basic nuclearwarheads or other weapons of mass destruc-tion, will be a in a strong position to deterthe United States from using conventionalforce, no matter the technological or otheradvantages we may enjoy. Even if suchenemies are merely able to threatenAmerican allies rather than the United Stateshomeland itself, America’s ability to projectpower will bedeeplycompromised.Alas, neitherAdmini-strationstrategists norPentagonforce plannersseem to havegrasped thiselementalpoint;certainly,efforts to fund,design anddevelop aneffectivesystem ofmissiledefenses do not reflect any sense of urgency.Nonetheless, the first task in transformingU.S. military to meet the technological andstrategic realities of a new century is tocreate such a system.Creating a system of global missiledefenses is but the first task oftransformation; the need to reshape U.S.conventional forces is almost as pressing.For, although American armed forcespossess capabilities and enjoy advantagesthat far surpass those of even our richest andclosest allies, let alone our declared andpotential enemies, the combination oftechnological and strategic change thatmarks the new century places theseadvantages at risk. Today’s U.S.conventional forces are masters of a matureparadigm of warfare, marked by thedominance of armored vehicles, aircraftcarriers and, especially, manned tacticalaircraft, that is beginning to be overtaken bya new paradigm, marked by long-rangeprecision strikes and the proliferation ofmissile technologies. Ironically, it has beenthe United States that has pioneered this newform of high-technology conventionalwarfare: it was suggested by the 1991 GulfWar and has been revealed more fully by theoperations of the past decade. Even the“Allied Force” air war for Kosovo showed adistorted version of the emerging paradigmof warfare.Yet even these pioneering capabilitiesare the residue of investments first made inthe mid- and late 1980s; over the pastdecade the pace of innovation within thePentagon has slowed measurably. In part,this is due to reduced defense budgets, theoverwhelming dominance of U.S. forcestoday, and the multiplicity of constabularymissions. And without the driving challengeof the Soviet military threat, efforts atinnovation have lacked urgency.Nonetheless, a variety of new potentialchallenges can be clearly foreseen. TheChinese military, in particular, seeks toexploit the revolution in military affairs tooffset American advantages in naval and airpower, for example. If the United States isto retain the technological and tacticaladvantages it now enjoys in large-scaleconventional conflicts, the effort attransformation must be considered aspressing a mission as preparing for today’spotential theater wars or constabularymissions – indeed, it must receive asignificant, separate allocation of forces andbudgetary resources over the next twodecades.In addition, the process of transfor-mation must proceed from an appreciationof American strategy and political goals.For example, as the leader of a global
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 13 network of alliances and strategicpartnerships, U.S. armed forces cannotretreat into a “Fortress America.” Thus,while long-range precision strikes willcertainly play an increasingly large role inU.S. military operations, American forcesmust remain deployed abroad, in largenumbers. To remain as the leader of avariety of coalitions, the United States mustpartake in the risks its allies face; securityguarantees that depend solely upon powerprojected from the continental United Stateswill inevitably become discounted.Moreover, the process of transformationshould proceed in a spirit of competitionamong the services and between service andjoint approaches. Inevitably, newtechnologies may create the need for entirelynew military organizations; this report willargue below that the emergence of space asa key theater of war suggests forcefully that,in time, it may be wise to create a separate“space service.” Thus far, the DefenseDepartment has attempted to take aprematurely joint approach totransformation. While it is certain that newtechnologies will allow for the closercombination of traditional servicecapabilities, it is too early in the process oftransformation to choke off what should bethe healthy and competitive face of“interservice rivalry.” Because the separateservices are the military institutions mostattuned to providing forces designed to carryout the specific missions required by U.S.strategy, they are in fact best equipped tobecome the engines of transformation andchange within the context of enduringmission requirements.Finally, it must be remembered that theprocess of transformation is indeed aprocess: even the most vivid view of thearmed forces of the future must be groundedin an understanding of today’s forces. Ingeneral terms, it seems likely that theprocess of transformation will take severaldecades and that U.S. forces will continue tooperate many, if not most, of today’sweapons systems for a decade or more.Thus, it can be foreseen that the process oftransformation will in fact be a two-stageprocess: first of transition, then of morethoroughgoing transformation. The break-point will come when a preponderance ofnew weapons systems begins to enterservice, perhaps when, for example,unmanned aerial vehicles begin to be asnumerous as manned aircraft. In this regard,the Pentagon should be very wary of makinglarge investments in new programs – tanks,planes, aircraft carriers, for example – thatwould commit U.S. forces to currentparadigms of warfare for many decades tocome.In conclusion, it should be clear thatthese four essential missions for maintainingAmerican military preeminence are quiteseparate and distinct from one another –none should be considered a “lesser includedcase” of another, even though they areclosely related and may, in some cases,require similar sorts of forces. Conversely,the failure to provide sufficient forces toexecute these four missions must result inproblems for American strategy. The failureto build missile defenses will put Americaand her allies at grave risk and compromisethe exercise of American power abroad.Conventional forces that are insufficient tofight multiple theater wars simultaneouslycannot protect American global interests andallies. Neglect or withdrawal fromconstabulary missions will increase thelikelihood of larger wars breaking out andencourage petty tyrants to defy Americaninterests and ideals. And the failure toprepare for tomorrow’s challenges willensure that the current Pax Americanacomes to an early end. .
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 14 Guarding theAmericansecurity peri-meter today –and tomorrow –will requirechanges in U.S.deployments andinstallationsoverseas. IIIR EPOSITIONING T ODAY ’ S F ORCE Despite the centrality of major theaterwars in conventional-force planning, it hasbecome painfully obvious that U.S. forceshave other vital roles to play in building anenduring American peace. The presence ofAmerican forces in critical regions aroundthe world is the visible expression of theextent of America’s status as a superpowerand as the guarantor of liberty, peace andstability. Our role in shaping the peacetimesecurity environment is an essential one, notto be renounced without great cost: it will bedifficult, if not impossible, to sustain therole of global guarantor without a substantialoverseas presence. Our allies, for whomregional problems are vital security interests,will come to doubt our willingness to defendtheir interests if U.S. forces withdraw into aFortress America. Equally important, ourworldwide web of alliances provides themost effective and efficient means forexercising American global leadership; thebenefits far outweigh the burdens. Whetherestablished in permanent bases or onrotational deployments, the operations ofU.S. and allied forces abroad provide thefirst line of defense of what may bedescribed as the “American securityperimeter.”Since the collapse of the Soviet empire,this perimeter has expanded slowly butinexorably. In Europe, NATO hasexpanded, admitting three new members andacquiring a larger number of “adjunct”members through the Partnership for Peaceprogram. Tens of thousands of U.S, NATOand allied troops are on patrol in theBalkans, and have fought a number ofsignificant actions there; in effect, the regionis on the road to becoming a NATOprotectorate. In the Persian Gulf region, thepresence of American forces, along withBritish and French units, has become a semi-permanent fact of life. Though theimmediate mission of those forces is toenforce the no-fly zones over northern andsouthern Iraq, they represent the long-termcommitment of the United States and itsmajor allies to a region of vital importance.Indeed, the UnitedStates has fordecades sought toplay a morepermanent role inGulf regionalsecurity. Whilethe unresolvedconflict with Iraqprovides theimmediatejustification, theneed for asubstantialAmerican forcepresence in the Gulf transcends the issue ofthe regime of Saddam Hussein. In EastAsia, the pattern of U.S. military operationsis shifting to the south: in recent years,significant naval forces have been sent to theregion around Taiwan in response toChinese provocation, and now a contingentof U.S. troops is supporting the Australian-led mission to East Timor. Across theglobe, the trend is for a larger U.S. securityperimeter, bringing with it new kinds ofmissions.The placement of U.S. bases has yet toreflect these realities – if anything, the
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 15 worldwide archipelago of U.S. militaryinstallations has contracted as the perimeterof U.S. security interests has expanded.American armed forces far from ideallypositioned to respond to the needs of thetimes, but the Pentagon remains tied tolevels of forward-deployed forces that bearlittle relationship to military capabilities orrealities. The air war in Kosovo provides avivid example: during Operation AlliedForce, U.S. and NATO warplanes werespread out across the continent of Europeand even into Asiatic Turkey, forced into awidely dispersed and very complex patternof operations – requiring extensive refuelingefforts and limiting the campaign itself – bya lack of adequate air bases in southeasternEurope. The network of American overseasinstallations and deployments requiresreconfiguration. Likewise, the structure ofU.S. forces needs to be reconsidered in lightof the changing mission of the Americanmilitary. Overall U.S. military forcestructure must be rationalized to accommo-date the fact that the presence of these forcesin far-flung outposts or on patrol overseasmay be as important as their theater-warfighting missions, especially in Europe.The requirements of Balkans stabilization,NATO expansion (including Partnership forPeace) and other missions within the theaterrender it unrealistic to expect U.S. forces inEurope to be readily available for othercrises, as formal Pentagon planningpresumes. The continuing challenges fromIraq also make it unwise to draw downforces in the Gulf dramatically. Securingthe American perimeter today – andtomorrow – will necessitate shifts in U.S.overseas operations.American armed forces stationed abroadand on rotational deployments around theworld should be considered as the first lineof American defenses, providing recon-naissance and security against the prospectof larger crises and conducting stabilityoperations to prevent their outbreak. Theseforces need to be among the most ready,with finely honed warfighting skills – andonly forces configured for combat indicatethe true American commitment to our alliesand their security interests – but they alsoneed to be highly versatile and mobile with abroad range of capabilities; they are thecavalry on the new American frontier. Inthe event of a large-scale war, they must beable to shape the battlefield whilereinforcing forces based primarily in theUnited States arrive to apply decisive blowsto the enemy. Not only must they berepositioned to reflect the shifting strategiclandscape, they also must be reorganizedand restructured to reflect their newmissions and to integrate new technologies. Europe At the end of the Cold War, the UnitedStates maintained more than 300,000 troopsin Europe, including two Army corps and 13Air Force wings plus a variety of indepen-dent sub-units, primarily based in Germany.The central plain of Germany was thecentral theater of the Cold War and, short ofan all-out nuclear exchange, a Sovietarmored invasion of western Europe theprincipal threat faced by the United Statesand its NATO allies. Today Germany isunified, Poland and the Czech Republicmembers of NATO, and the Russian armyhas retreated to the gates of Moscow whilebecoming primarily engaged in theCaucasus and to the south more generally.Though northern and central Europe arearguably more stable now than at any timein history, the majority of American forcesin Europe are still based in the north,including a theater army and a corps of twoheavy divisions in Germany and just fiveAir Force wings, plus a handful of other,smaller units.But while northern and central Europehave remained extraordinarily stable, andthe eastern Germany, Poland and the CzechRepublic have become reintegrated into themainstream of European political, economicand cultural life, the situation in south-eastern Europe has been a tumultuous one.The Balkans, and southeastern Europe more
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 16The continuing deployment of forces inthe Balkans reflects a U.S. commitmentto the region’s security. By refusing totreat these deployments as a shift of thepermanent American presence inEurope, the Clinton Administration hasincreased the burden on the armedservices exponentially. generally, present the major hurdle towardthe creation of a Europe “whole and free”from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The delayin bringing security and stability to south-eastern Europe has not only prevented theconsolidation of the victory in the Cold War,it has created a zone of violence and conflictand introduced uncertainty about America’srole in Europe.At the same time, the continuingdeployment of forces in the Balkans reflectswhat is in fact a long-term Americancommitment to the security of the region.But by refusing to treat these deploymentsas an expansion – or shift – of the permanentAmerican presence in Europe, reflecting anenduring interest, the ClintonAdministration has increased the burden onthe armed services exponentially. Ratherthan recognizing the need to reposition andreconfigure U.S. forces in Europe awayfrom the north to the southeast, currentpolicy has been to rotate units in and out ofthe Balkans, destroying their readiness toperform other missions and tying up anincreasingly large slice of a significantlyreduced force.Despite the shifting focus of conflict inEurope, a requirement to station U.S. forcesin northern and central Europe remains. Theregion is stable, but a continued Americanpresence helps to assure the major Europeanpowers, especially Germany, that the UnitedStates retains its longstanding securityinterest in the continent. This is especiallyimportant in light of the nascent Europeanmoves toward an independent defense“identity” and policy; it is important thatNATO not be replaced by the EuropeanUnion, leaving the United States without avoice in European security affairs. Inaddition, many of the current installationsand facilities provide critical infrastructurefor supporting U.S. forces throughoutEurope and for reinforcement in the event ofa crisis. From airbases in England andGermany to headquarters and Army units inBelgium and Germany, much of the currentnetwork of U.S. bases in northern andcentral retains its relevance today as in theCold War.However, changes should be made toreflect the larger shift in European securityneeds. U.S. Army Europe should betransformed from a single corps of twoheavy divisions and support units intoversatile, combined-arms brigade-sized unitscapable of independent action andmovement over operational distances. U.S.Air Force units in Europe need to undergo asimilar reorientation. The currentinfrastructure in England and Germanyshould be retained. The NATO air base atAviano, Italy, long the primary location forair operations over the Balkans, needs to besubstantially improved. As with groundforces, serious consideration should be givento establishing a permanent and modernNATO and U.S. airfield in Hungary forsupport to central and southern Europe. InTurkey, Incirlik Air Base, home ofOperation Northern Watch, also needs to beexpanded, improved and perhapssupplemented with a new base in easternTurkey.
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Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century 17Almost a decade after the end of theGulf War, no-fly-zone operationscontinue over northern and southernIraq. Although U.S. Navy and Marine forcesgenerally operate on a regular cycle ofdeployments to European waters, they relyon a network of permanent bases in theregion, especially in the Mediterranean.These should be retained, and considerationgiven to establishing a more robust presencein the Black Sea. As NATO expands andthe pattern of U.S. military operations inEurope continues to shift to the south andeast, U.S. naval presence in the Black Sea issure to increase. However, as will bediscussed in detail below, this presenceshould be based less frequently on full-scalecarrier battle groups.